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Date: 1/28/00
Time: 7:07:23 PM
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B.S.N. Murti, Vietnam Divided: The Unfinished Struggle. London: Asia Publishing House, 1964.
I. Geneva Conference on Indochina
By 1944 the Viet Minh had stirred action against the Japanese near the Chinese border in Northern Tonkin. Seeing the "Red light" of an allied victory, the Japanese overthrew the French administration on March 9, 1945, and took over the control of the French army and navy. "The Colonial status of French Indochina has ended," announced the Japanese Radio. The following day, they put Emperor Bao Dai at the head of a nominally independent Vietnamese administration uniting Tonkin with Annam. With the French out of the way, the Viet Minh became more active and took over the northern provinces of Tonkin which had no Japanese soldiers stationed. The Viet Minh also called upon the French to collaborate against the Japanese, but the French authorities who served the Japanese interests in Indochina for four years considered the Viet Minh as bandits and took cleaning up operations against them. [In 1946 Emperor Bao Dai declared that the French by their own actions had ended their protectorate over Vietnam when they defaulted on their obligation to defend the country.]
Nevertheless, the Viet Minh declared in May 1945 the seven northern provinces of Cao Bang, Lang Son, Ha Giang, Bac Kan, Tuyen Quang, Thai Nguyen and Bac Giang a liberated zone. Since there was no other organized group to forestall them, on August 19, 1945, after the Japanese surrender to the Allies, the Viet Minh proclaimed the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and Ho Chi Minh, the leader of the movement, became President of the Republic. On September 2 President Ho Chi Minh proclaimed the Independence of Vietnam, and Bao Dai, under the name of Vinh Thuy, was appointed Supreme Counselor of State.
In the meantime, the Big Powers in Europe were deciding the fate of the Asian countries which were under Japanese occupation during the war. At the Potsdam Conference held in July 1945 it had been decided that the surrender of the Japanese troops in Indochina south of the 16th Parallel should be accepted by the Southeast Asia Command under Lord Mountbatten, and north of the 16th Parallel by the Chinese troops of Chiang Kai-shek. Accordingly, the British troops under General Douglas Gracey had arrived on September 12, 1945, in Saigon.
It is interesting to note that the situation in Vietnam at this moment was rather delicate. Neither the British nor the Chinese troops moved into Vietnam immediately after V-J Day. By the time the Allied troops arrived in the country the Democratic Republic of Vietnam had proclaimed its independence and was demanding that it be recognized. French authority had been replaced. However, the two occupying armies in the north and in the south of the 16th Parallel followed different policies in their dealings with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.
General Gracey refused to recognize the Viet Minh administration and he released and rearmed the French who had been interned by the Japanese and helped them to seize power in Saigon. [General Gracey has placed on record what actually happened when he arrived in Saigon on September 13. He said, "I was welcomed on arrival by Viet Minh, who said 'welcome' and all that sort of thing. It was a very unpleasant situation and I promptly kicked them out" (Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society July-October 1953 p. 213).]
It is very difficult to know at what level the decision was taken to restore France to full sovereignty in Indochina, if it was taken at all. Nevertheless, it is clear from available records that General Gracey disregarded his instructions and took upon himself to restore Indochina south of the 16th parallel to the French. [Lord Mountbatten's (The Supreme Allied Commander Southeast Asia) instructions to Gracey were explicit: "Sole mission: disarm the Japanese. Do not get involved in keeping order."] It is surprising to find the British Labour Government, at a time when it was already committed to freeing India and Burma, signing an agreement with the French on October 9, recognizing the French civil administration as the only one entitled to direct non-military forces south of the 16th Parallel. However, it was the British who reinstalled the discredited French authority south of the 16th Parallel thereby making themselves responsible for the war which followed in Vietnam. Early in 1946, all British troops were withdrawn and the French resumed complete military and administrative control in Saigon. It became the primary preoccupation of the French to fight the Viet Minh guerrillas who were operating all over the countryside.
North of the 16th Parallel the situation was different. The Chinese who occupied the area proclaimed a policy of non-interference in Vietnam's internal affairs and left the Vietnamese in charge of the administration. The Chinese were not very enthusiastic about restoring the French authority in Vietnam. The reasons for this attitude were many. The Chinese had a traditional interest in Vietnam and they wanted to reassert their influence over Tonkin. They also had a score to settle with the French for their pre-war penetration of Yunnan province and allowing Indochina to be converted into a Japanese base against China. French troops and civilian officials were refused entry into Tonkin. This made it necessary for the French to appease the Chinese in order to eliminate the danger of an armed clash when they arrived in the North. Even after the Franco-Chinese treaty of February 28, 1946, by which the Chinese agreed to withdraw from Tonkin, was signed, they still insisted on the French entering into an agreement with Ho Chi Minh before they could bring their troops into Tonkin.
As a result, the French had to conclude an agreement with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam on March 6, 1946. By this agreement, France recognized the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (Tonkin and Annam and not merely the territory north of the 16th Parallel) as "a free State with its own Government, parliament, army and finances, forming part of the Indochinese Federation of the French Union." The French Government pledged itself to a referendum to determine whether Cochin-China should be united with Tonkin and Annam. In exchange, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam was prepared to allow the entry of French troops into Vietnam for a period of five years. [The military annex to the March 6th Agreement fixed the number of troops to occupy Vietnam at 25,000--15,000 Frenchmen and 10,000 Vietnamese under overall French command. The French soldiers in charge of the Japanese were to leave as soon as their job was completed with a deadline of ten months. Units guarding naval and air bases were to have the length of their stay determined later. As to the rest--the units which would join the Vietnamese in keeping order north of the sixteenth parallel--they were to be withdrawn in five equal annual installments. In 1952 no French troops would be left in Vietnam, with the possible exception of those guarding bases.] The French came back to Northern Vietnam, but the Viet Minh had won recognition from France and counted on the promise that in five years all French troops would vacate Vietnam. At this stage Ho Chi Minh insisted that the objective of independence of Vietnam had not been abandoned, but its attainment was deferred.
After the March 6th agreement, the story of Franco-Vietnamese relations rapidly deteriorated and finally resulted in open hostilities between the two parties. The Dalat Conference which met on April 18, 1946, to discuss various problems between the representatives of France and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam failed on the crucial question of the status of Cochin-China. The French regarded Cochin-China as their colony and the Viet Minh insisted it was an integral part of Vietnam. On June 1, the French authorities announced the setting up of a provisional government in Cochin-China and recognized it. The Viet Minh regarded this as a breach of the March Agreement. When in July 1946 a Conference had assembled at Fontainebleau in France, to discuss the question of independence of Vietnam, the French High Commissioner in Indochina called a second conference at Dalat with representatives from Cambodia, Laos, Cochin-China and South Annam and omitted the Viet Minh. As a result the Viet Minh delegates walked out of the Fontainebleau Conference. However, Ho Chi Minh, who was in France at that time, arranged a modus vivendi with France on September 14, 1946, providing for the cessation of hostilities and settling certain cultural and economic questions between the two countries.
Unfortunately serious incidents took place between the French troops and the Vietnamese troops at Lang Son and Haiphong in the North in November 1946--on November 23, Haiphong was bombarded by the French. By December, the Vietnamese Government started evacuating Hanoi, their capital city, and on December 19, French strongholds were attacked by the Vietnamese and the following day fighting began at Hue, Tourane and various other places all over Vietnam. The fight that started in December 1946 ended only with the signing of a ceasefire agreement in Geneva in 1954.
For France the war in Vietnam became a war of reconquest. Its plan was to create an Indochinese Federation in which it would be the senior partner with a casting vote. Hence, it refused to recognize the unity and independence of Vietnam, although the Viet Minh had agreed to remain within the French Union. Abandoning the idea of negotiations with the Viet Minh, the French Government conceived of a new plan by which the colonial character of the war could be superficially modified so as to make it appear as a "game for liberation." Independence and unity were conceded to Bao Dai who was set up as a counterpoise to Ho Chi Minh in March 1949. Both the Viet Minh and Bao Dai henceforth claimed to represent the Government of Vietnam. Thus the Franco-Viet Minh conflict was presented by France as a civil war between two Vietnamese groups fighting for the same objectives of independence and unity. The essential aim of the French, however, was to maintain and preserve their political and economic domination in Vietnam. There was hardly any desire on the part of the French to negotiate except on the basis of complete surrender by the Viet Minh. Until 1949, France was in fact fighting a colonial war under the guise of a liberator. (2-6) . . . The victory of communism in China in 1949 changed the situation radically in Vietnam. The recognition of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam by the People's Republic of China on January 18, 1950, and by the USSR on January 31, 1950, indicated that it could no longer be treated as a mere rebel group. To the French it looked like the vanguard of a Communist thrust towards Southeast Asia, and this interpretation they passed on to the USA, hoping that it would fit into the general American strategic scheme. Even the US recognized the implications and agreed to aid the French, it refused to Americanize the Indochinese War, as the whole of Southeast Asia lay beyond its defense perimeter in the Pacific which, according to Secretary of State Acheson's statement of January 12, 1950, passed through the Aleutians, Japan, the Ryukyuo Islands to the Philippines. While refusing to participate in the war directly, the Secretary of State nevertheless admitted that the US "must be prepared to meet wherever possible all thrusts of the Soviet Union." The US therefore recognized the Bao Dai regime on February 7, 1950.
France was forced to look for American help because of military and economic weakness. With a view to keeping their part of the bargain with the US, the French tried to change the character of the war. They repeatedly told the Americans that the Indochinese conflict was anti-communist in character. In order to give a semblance of reality to this claim the French had created a body of anti-Viet Minh opinion in Vietnam. These Nationalists in their very desire to vie with the Viet Minh refused to be satisfied with anything less than real independence which would give them the right even to quit the French Union. It was too late for the French. Once the lid was taken off the Indochinese cauldron, with whatever precautions the French might have done it, it could not be put back. Thus Communist victory in China started a chain of reactions which pushed the French from one position to another, from colonialism to anti-communism. (7-8) . . . The Conference on Indochina opened in Geneva on April 26, 1954, and, following preliminary consultations on the question of participants to be invited, the first plenary session on Indochina was held on May 8. delegations from nine countries participated in the meetings. The countries represented in the conference were: Cambodia, Democratic Republic of Vietnam, France, Laos, People's Republic of China, State of Vietnam, the Soviet Union, the United kingdom and the United States of America.
During discussions, once the French readiness to negotiate all political and military questions with the adversaries was known, the talks on Indochina at Geneva reduced themselves to the settlement of technicalities.
At this stage, it would be useful to note the attitude of the State of Vietnam delegation tot he Geneva Conference. Dr. Tran Van Do, leader of the South Vietnam Delegation to the Conference, had sent a note on July 17, 1954, to the French authorities protesting that they were negotiating for a ceasefire in Vietnam without keeping the Vietnamese Government informed. The allegation was denied by the French. On July 18 Dr. Tran Van Do put forward his own proposals for a ceasefire in the form of a declaration. This declaration called for a settlement in the following stages, all of which would be under UN supervision:
(1) A ceasefire throughout Vietnam without any demarcation line being drawn;
(2) The regrouping of the forces of both sides in specified areas;
(3) The disarming of all irregular forces;
(4) The disarming of the Viet Minh forces and the simultaneous withdrawal of all foreign troops from Vietnam; and
(5) Elections throughout Vietnam when, in the opinion of the UN, security and order had been reestablished.
However, the ceasefire agreement was signed on July 21, between the High Commands of the French Union Forces and the People's Army by which the two parties agreed to stop fighting and Vietnam was provisionally divided at the 17th Parallel between the French Union Forces high Command and the People's Army of Vietnam. Certain areas were agreed upon by the parties for the purpose of regroupment of troops of the two parties and general elections in the whole of the country, which would bring about the unity of Vietnam, would be held before July 1956. An international commission composed of India, Canada and Poland was appointed to supervise the armistice with India as Chairman. The parties were specifically prohibited from allowing establishment of foreign bases and import of any war materials and military personnel excepting by way of replacement. It was agreed that all prisoners of war and civilian internees were to be liberated within 30 days of the ceasefire agreement and both parties agreed to refrain from reprisals against all those who fought against them during hostilities.
The exclusion of South Vietnam from the ceasefire agreement is very significant. Even though France wanted armistice discussions to be multilateral so that the South Vietnam Government could also participate, the Democratic Republic would have nothing to do with the Bao Dai Government and insisted on making the discussions bilateral with France. By excluding the State of Vietnam from the ceasefire agreement, the Democratic Republic probably wanted to show to the world that they were the only Vietnamese party which fought against France for freedom and at the same time to impress upon the Vietnamese that the Bao Dai Government was not independent and only a "puppet" of France.
However, there must have been some miscalculation at that time on the part of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. They must have thought that the South Vietnam Government would never be able to assert its independence and become strong enough to demand the French withdrawal. They underestimated the American interest in South Vietnam and expected to exploit the chaotic conditions in the South for gaining their political ends. However, as has already been observed, the events took a different turn in the South and the exclusion of the South Vietnam Government from the armistice agreement proved a grave blunder. this does not mean that everything would have been amicably settled if only the South Vietnam Government had been allowed to sign the armistice agreement. Nevertheless it provided an apparently valid excuse to the South Vietnam Government to proclaim that they were not bound by the Geneva Agreement as they did not sign the document.
The reactions of different countries to the ceasefire agreement were varied and significant. The Democratic Republic of Vietnam Delegation felt that the Geneva Agreements were an important victory of the people of Vietnam, a victory of the forces of peace and democracy, the world over. The French Premier declared on July 22, in the French national Assembly, that the Agreements were "undoubtedly the best which were attainable in the present state of affairs." The French Delegation was particularly happy over the provisions of the Agreement as their "best allies themselves did not expect, several weeks ago, that we could obtain the terms which we have actually been able to obtain."
The American attitude could be seen clearly from the separate Declaration made by Mr. Bedell-Smith, the US representative at the time of the consideration of the Final Declaration. According to his statement, the US Government took note of the ceasefire agreement signed between the parties and also of paragraphs 1 to 12, inclusive, of the Final Declaration. [The Final Declaration contains 13 paragraphs but the US Government refused to take note of the 13th paragraph which reads: "The members of the Conference agree to consult one another on any question which may be referred to them by the International Supervisory Commission in order to study such measures as may prove necessary to ensure that the agreements on the cessation of hostilities in Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam are respected."] The US Government declared, with regard to the Agreements and paragraphs, that it would refrain from the threat or the use of force to disturb them. The US policy in placing ambiguous reservations was dictated by severe criticism at home for the American failure at the Geneva Conference. President Eisenhower, however, did not consider that the United States had suffered a major diplomatic defeat at Geneva because "that was an unfinished battle and in any event there was no such thing as acknowledging defeat in the execution of foreign policy." [New York Times May 6, 1954.] It is clear that the United States took the Geneva Agreement as a challenge and the separate declaration made by the US representative at Geneva was a clear warning of things to happen.
Soon after the signing of the ceasefire agreement, the President of the United States made it clear in a statement that the United States had not been a belligerent in this war, and the primary responsibility for the settlement in Indochina rested with those nations which had participated in the fighting. Clarifying the position of his country, the US President stated that "the United States has not itself been a party to, or bound by the decisions of the Conference, but it is our hope that it will lead to the establishment of peace consistent with the rights and the needs of the countries concerned." Nevertheless, the Chief of the US Delegation, Bedell-Smith, in a statement on July 23, affirmed his conviction that "the results were the best that we would possibly have obtained in the circumstances." He further felt that "diplomacy had rarely been able to gain at the conference table what would not be gained or helped on the battlefield."
However, the reaction of the State of Vietnam Delegation was most ominous. After protesting against "the rejection of their proposals without examination," the Vietnamese delegation registered four "solemn protests" as follows:
(i) Against "the haste with which the armistice agreement has been concluded by the French and Viet Minh High Commands," in which connection it was stated that "many clauses of the agreement are of a nature which gravely compromise the political future of the Vietnamese people;"
(ii) Against "the fact that the armistice agreement abandons to the Viet Minh certain territories which are still occupied by Vietnam troops and which are essential for the defense of Vietnam against further communist expansionism;"
(iii) Against "the French High Command in arrogating to itself the right, without prior consultation with the State of Vietnam, of fixing the date of future elections;" and
(iv) Against "the manner in which the armistice has been concluded and the conditions of the armistice, which took no account of the aspirations of the Vietnamese people."
It was added in the Declaration that the Vietnamese Government reserved "full liberty of action to safeguard the sacred rights of the people in Vietnam to territorial unity, national independence and liberty." In Saigon, the Prime minister of the State of Vietnam, Mr. Ngo Dinh Diem, in a broadcast on July 22, denounced the ceasefire agreement as an "inequity" against which his Government had raised a most solemn protest and ordered all flags to be flown at half-mast for three days. (14-19) . . . On the diplomatic level, the Indochina settlement amounted only to an adjustment of power relations, concealing a full Western retreat and a simultaneous Sino-Soviet advance. The Western Powers considered the Geneva Agreements as a timesaving device, allowing them, so they hoped, to build up positions of strength which would enable them to return to the Conference table under improved conditions. Thus, the real political issues were not faced at Geneva but only postponed.
At the concluding session of the Geneva Conference which took place on July 21, 1954, the Conference as a whole approved a number of documents concerning the ceasefire in Indochina. The three Agreements on the cessation of hostilities in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos concluded between the High Command of the People's Army of Vietnam on one hand, and the Associated States of France, on the other, were signed by Ta-quaing-Buu and Brigadier General Delteil. In addition to these three Agreements, the Geneva Documents contained texts of declarations made by the Governments of the French Republic, Cambodia and Laos; the Final Declaration of the Geneva Conference and the Declaration of the representative of the United States of America.
It is significant to find that the Final Declaration made by the Geneva Conference consisting of 13 clauses did not include in the body of its text the three ceasefire Agreements. None of the 13 clauses dealt with the ceasefire line or the regrouping of forces. The ceasefire Agreements of Vietnam and Laos did not refer to the elections or the modus vivendi of a final political settlement in Vietnam and Laos. It is interesting to note that in Cambodia, where the communist movement and resistance was futile, the parties had no inhibitions about incorporating a political settlement in the Agreement itself. It is, therefore, logical to separate the military from the political aspects of the Geneva Agreement regarding cessation of hostilities in Vietnam, although the two react on one another.
The Geneva Agreements brought to an end a long drawn out war and ensured peace to the people of Indochina. With the end of a shooting war in Vietnam the world became free of a major war for the first time in 23 years since the Japanese invaded Manchuria in 1931.
The structure of the "arrangement on cessation of hostilities in Vietnam" is based upon a ceasefire throughout the country and upon the regropupment of forces on the two sides of the Provisional Demarcation Line. The Agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Vietnam provides for specific dates and time at which the ceasefire shall be effected by the forces of the two High Commands; within five days they had to disengage and then within 15 days withdraw to the Provisional Assembly Areas agreed to by the two parties and after that, according to the agreed time schedule, the troops of the People's Army of Vietnam and the French High Command had to withdraw to the North and South of the 17th Parallel along which the ceasefire line had been agreed to as a Provisional Military Demarcation Line.
The hostilities in Vietnam were that of a guerrilla nature with no clear cut and defined front line and the forces of the two parties were extensively interlocked all over the country. The troops of the regular People's Army High Command supported by irregulars and partisans were fighting in all the theaters of operation from Dien Bien Phu in the North to Ca Mau peninsula in the South, in the Delta areas, in the mountains and in the jungles.
Even though the parties decided on the principle of a simultaneous ceasefire throughout all parts of Vietnam in all areas of hostilities and for all the forces of the two parties--realizing the complex situation and the time that would be required to transmit the ceasefire order down to the lowest echelons of the combatant forces of the two sides--the two parties agreed that the cessation of hostilities should take place on three different dates in three different regions of Vietnam. The only delay in an overall ceasefire all over the country was due to technical difficulties in communicating with guerrillas in remote areas.
Accordingly, the ceasefire was to take place on July 27, 1954, in North Vietnam and on August 11 in South Vietnam.
In spite of the difficulties involved, the two High Commands issued ceasefire orders to all their regular, irregular and guerrilla units to stop fighting and consequently at the fixed date and time the fighting stopped all over Vietnam. Even though there was a time lag of 20 days between the date of signing the ceasefire and the final ending of the shooting war in Vietnam, there was no military activity in any battlefield since the date of the signing of the Agreement in Geneva.
As a first step of separation of combatant forces in all sectors of war in Vietnam, the units of the opposing forces broke contact and assembled within the temporary camping areas so as to avoid any encounter which could give rise to an incident. Neither party was authorized to allow any fresh troops into the disengagement zone. The temporary camping areas for the disengaged troops were laid out in such a manner that the troops of the two parties were separated by a zone of approximately three kilometers in width. The two High Commands agreed that from the coming into force of order of ceasefire, to prohibit opening of fire with any weapon whatever, carrying out of any land, naval or air war operation, carrying out of any reconnaissance operation, and making any attempt at sabotage and against the life and property of the civil population.
The French Union High Command supplied airplanes to the People's Army high Command to carry 15 of their Liaison Officers (15 trips in all) to enable them to broadcast the ceasefire order in regions where it was difficult to contact or communicate with the guerrilla fighters, particularly in the area of Nam Bo and Phu Quoc.
According to the agreed plan, the troops of the two parties disengaged themselves within five days and withdrew to the Provisional Assembly Areas fixed by the Geneva Agreement within 15 days of the ceasefire. In this process, the People's Army took over Bac-Giang, Bac-Ninh, Ninh-Yen, Phuc-Yen, Son-Tay, Hung-Yen and Hai-Ninh in the Hanoi perimeter. It must be said to the credit of the two parties that the ceasefire, disengagement of troops, and withdrawal into the Provisional Assembly Areas was carried out in a smooth and orderly manner.
During the ending of hostilities in Vietnam, only one incident of the noncompliance of the ceasefire order by the irregular forces under the French Union High Command occurred. About 1500 "partisans" under the leadership of one Tai Chin Quy in the Upper Valley of the Red River, Pakha Region (Northwest Vietnam) neither laid down their arms nor moved into the French provisional assembly area in North Vietnam. These guerrillas were a part of the irregular forces under the French Union High Command who also issued orders. According to the French, the order for ceasefire was conveyed to the partisans on July 26, 1954. The French Union forces ceased supplies to these groups and advised them to proceed to Laos to rejoin the French forces. But the partisans of Pakha did not wish to migrate to Laos and hesitated to surrender to the People's Army for fear of reprisals because of their fight against them during hostilities. They continued fighting.
These partisans started raiding villages to obtain supplies for their men and in the process committed crimes against the people who refused to give them food. The local authorities started operations to subjugate the partisans and bring about peace and order in the area and prevent raids on the villages. The amnesty policy announced by the local authorities after the ceasefire resulted in a surrender of the great majority of the partisans to the People's Army. The authorities refrained from any reprisals against the partisans who surrendered after the ceasefire. (20-24) * * * II. Vietnam Divided
The People's Army was anxious to retain the provinces of Quang Nghia and Qui Nhon in Central Vietnam which were under their occupation since 1945. The people of these provinces were the best supporters of the People's Army in its fight against the French in Central Vietnam. The main consideration of the People's Army Delegation was to save the population of this area from falling under the rule of the French Union Forces. On the other hand, the French Union Forces were equally concerned with the Catholic population of North Vietnam, who were their only sympathizers during their struggle against the People's Army. They were particularly anxious to keep the provinces of Nghe-an and Ha Tinh where they received the maximum support from the people. Both parties were interested in saving the section of population which supported and sympathized with them from possible reprisals and victimization. However reasonable and genuine the considerations for the retention of the two provinces by the People's Army in Central Vietnam and two provinces by the French in the North might be, the parties could not agree to such an arrangement as they wanted to separate the armies of the two parties on both sides of a simple ceasefire line to avoid any possible renewal of fighting. Naturally, the two parties wanted guarantees before they could agree to any such ceasefire line.
The People's Army Delegation insisted on the inclusion in the ceasefire agreement of a provision by which the large number of their supporters, who would remain South of the ceasefire line, should be saved from any possible reprisals because of their support or association with the People's Army during the hostilities. Talking about the population from these areas who would remain South of the ceasefire line, Mr. Pham Van Dong, Foreign Minister of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, said "this is a very bitter matter for us. Of the nine million who remain South of the line, three million are now in liberated areas. They will now fall under the rule of the Bao Dai gendarmerie and police. Two million of them have never been under colonial rule since we declared independence in 1945." On the other hand, the French Union Forces Delegation insisted on the inclusion of a provision to give the Catholic population living North of the ceasefire line to choose their zone of residence after the ceasefire. (25-6) . . . The two parties agreed to fix the demarcation line along the mouth of Song Ben Hai (Cua Tung river) and the course of that river (known as Rao Thanh in the mountains) to the village of Bo Ho Su, then parallel from Bo Ho Su to the Laos-Vietnam frontier. All along this demarcation line visible signs had been placed at the points of entry by each party on the side assigned to it. The signs bear the following sentences in the French and Vietnamese languages: "Ligne de demarcation militaire provisoire." "Gioi Tuyen Quan Su Tam Thoi." This task was completed by both parties before August 27, 1954, within 35 days of the ceasefire Agreement. (28-9) * * * III. A Unique Experiment
The actual withdrawal of the French Union Forces from the city of Haiphong on May 13, 1955, was one of the best organized operations in history. The city of Haiphong was divided into two zones and each zone in its turn was divided into four installments for purposes of transfer. On each line delimiting these installments a number of meeting points between the Liaison Officers of both parties had been established. The Liaison Officers met at these points at the hour fixed on the withdrawal plan. (In certain places 30 minutes before the prescribed time). In order to facilitate the meeting at the contacting points each Liaison Officer carried a green flag as a distinctive token agreed upon in advance. Then the French Liaison Officer guided the supplementary guard and administrative detachment of the People's Army towards sites fixed in advance in each installment where they met the advance parties who were already there and assume responsibilities. At each site the French Union troops handed over to the People's Army the responsibility of the guard and utilization of the building. After transferring the guard of a site the French Union Forces withdrew. The next moment one would see the red flag with yellow star coming up all over the area transferred and the People's Army police controlling the traffic and movements. That was the completion of withdrawal of the French Union Forces from Haiphong. Their last ship left Haiphong port at 4:15 P.M. (Saigon Time) on May 13, 1955, to Do Son and then to the island of Cat Ba on May 16, 1955, from where the last vestiges of the French authority North of the 17th Parallel disappeared. (43-4) * * * IV. Ban on Military Bases
In addition to the prohibition on introduction of foreign troops and war materials into Vietnam, the Geneva Conference took note of the provisions "that no military base under the control of a foreign State may be established in the regrouping zones of the two parties, the latter having the obligation to see that the zones allotted to them shall not constitute part of any military alliance and shall not be utilized for the resumption of hostilities or in the service of an aggressive policy." (46) . . . . . . The world has witnessed a number of military alliances between countries coming together for their own defense but the curious aspect of the South East Asia Treaty Organization is its constant reference to an area, an area not of the countries concerned, but an area which those countries themselves can designate as under their protection if they so agree unanimously. According to Walter Lippmann, the well-known American columnist, this was the first instance of an international treaty legally interfering in the internal affairs of a non-signatory. As Jawaharlal Nehru put it: "this particular Manila Treaty is looking dangerously in the direction of spheres of influence exercised by powerful countries." (48-9) . . . The Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam stated on October 22, 1954, that the Manila Treaty "constitutes a flagrant violation of the Geneva Agreement; an encroachment upon the independence and sovereignty of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, and a threat tot he security and peace of the people of Southeast Asia." General Giap in a memorandum to the Chairman of the International Commission on December 5, 1954, mentioned that the inclusion of South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia in such a Treaty "proves more clearly the intentions of its initiators to hinder the implementation of the Geneva Agreement on Indochina." However, the French Union High Command in Indochina, while emphasizing its stabilizing and non-aggressive intentions, clarified that "the formula adopted at Manila took the prohibition contained in the Geneva Agreement against the participation of Vietnam in any military alliance strictly into account." It maintained that the State of Vietnam was not a party but only covered by the guarantee stipulated in the text.
Soon after the conclusion of the Manila Treaty, M. Guy la Chambre and General Paul Ely, Commander-in-Chief of the French Union Forces in Indochina, visited the United State towards the end of September 1954 to negotiate for military and economic aid to the French Expeditionary Corps and the Associated States of Indochina. As a result of these talks, the US Government promised to grant direct aid to South Vietnam instead of through the French Government as heretofore. In a letter to Premier Ngo Dinh Diem of South Vietnam, President Eisenhower wrote: "The implications of the (Geneva) Agreement concerning Vietnam caused a grave concern regarding the future of a country temporarily divided by artificial military grouping, weakened by a long and exhaustive war and faced by enemies without and by their subversive collaborators within." The President added: "The purpose of aid would be to help Vietnam in developing and maintaining a strong and viable State capable of resisting attempted subversion or aggression through military means." [New York Times, October 29, 1954.]
Within a few days General J. Lawton Collins, Special Envoy of President Eisenhower arrived in Saigon on November 8, 1954, to coordinate the US aid to Indochina and to take measures to save this region from communism. At a press conference on November 17, 1954, he announced that a US Military Mission had been entrusted with instructing a Vietnamese Army. "This American mission will soon take charge of instructing the Vietnamese Army in accordance with special American methods which have proved effective in Korea, Greece and Turkey and other parts of the world," he said. He further stated that the American Military Mission would work under the supervision of General Paul Ely who would remain as the Commander-in-Chief in Indochina. However, General O'Daniel of the US Army took over the actual training and organization of the South Vietnamese Army as Chief of the US Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG).
In the meantime, a new situation was created in the West which enhanced the importance of Collins' mission in South Vietnam. That was the announcement made by Sir Anthony Eden on November 8, 1954, in the House of Commons that the Viet Minh had continued to reinforce their formidable military power in North Vietnam. He said that by the end of 1954 the Viet Minh would have twice as many regular field formations as at the time of the Geneva Agreement. This statement was followed by a series of statements and comments by the Western statesmen and the press. (50-51) . . . As far as the question of the increase of the People's Army is concerned, the position was clarified by the Chairman of the International Commission at a Press Conference on November 21, 1954, in Saigon. He pointed out that the Geneva Agreement was not concerned with the increase or decrease of the forces of either the French Union or the People's Army inside the territory. But there are specific bans on the importation of military personnel, war materials and armaments. The International Commission never took a census of arms and war material inside Vietnam on the day it started its work. If the US and French intelligence was to be believed, the war materials should have come into Vietnam some months before the armistice. Commenting on the press reports on the increase of the People's Army, General Giap stated that it would be materially impossible to double within two or three months the army which had required years of effort to build up. "Yet one needs to unleash such gratuitous and ridiculous news," he said, "in order to camouflage the plots of aggression and to sabotage the armistice Agreement. . . ."
As to the argument that the increased army must have been armed with war materials imported from China, one should take that as an opinion only. The two parties agreed after considerable discussion at Geneva to fix 14 points with full knowledge of the geographical position and state of communications in Vietnam. The locations of the Commission's Inspection Teams were selected by the rival commanders who were familiar with the terrain and had an interest to see that all entry points were controlled. In view of the fact that both the parties knew the lines of communication along which transport laden with war material could travel, it is difficult to understand why only seven points were fixed in the North. Probably concessions were made on both sides and as the geographical factors limit movements to certain regions, the check points were fixed by the parties with these factors in mind. Obviously no significant import of armaments could take place through the fixed points which were controlled by the Fixed Teams of the International Commission. Mr. M.A. Desai made it clear that the Commission was satisfied that the main routes along which war material could come were effectively controlled. "But the Commission can never say that since the Commission started functioning not one rifle has come in from outside into Vietnam, north or south," he said. It is interesting to note in this connection that the French High Command preferred not to answer a specific request from the International Commission asking it to furnish further details of the basis on which it had made serious allegations regarding the import of war materials into North Vietnam and to produce any material evidence it had in support of its allegation. (53-4) . . . . . . Nowhere does the Geneva Agreement or the Final Declaration refer to the arrangements or to agreements entered into by the Associated States of Indochina with other countries previous to July 21, 1954. But it was obvious, in view of the mandatory provisions contained in the Geneva Agreement against all possibilities of the resumption of hostilities in Vietnam or reinforcements of additional army personnel or war materials, that any military clause in such Agreements entered into between the United States and France regarding the State of Vietnam would have to be cancelled. But no such action was taken. General Ely emphasized in a Press Statement on January 21, 1955, that he gave his consent to the project of American participation in the training of a Vietnamese Army "because it came within the framework of the Geneva Agreement and under express conditions that it be kept within the confines of that Agreement." (56) . . . In early 1962, the US Government had set up a full-fledged Military Command in Saigon under General Paul Harkins, and had increased its military Mission's strength there to 4,500 soldiers, to be further raised to 7,000. [The Hindu, Madras, March 1, 1962. The total strength of MAAG and French instructors present in Vietnam at the time of the Armistice was 888.] The new Command was not only engaged in training the South Vietnamese Army but had virtually taken over operational direction of the Civil War which developed in South Vietnam. American pilots were participating in bombing missions and the US Seventh Fleet patrolling the Vietnamese coastal waters to prevent men and supplies from North Vietnam reaching the guerrillas. The US Special Forces had taken over the responsibility of military intelligence, communications and logistics also.
After carefully watching the military buildup in South Vietnam, the International Commission came to the conclusion that the South Vietnam Government was guilty of violating the Geneva Agreement by receiving military aid far in excess of what was contemplated by the Agreement. It also pointed out that the South Vietnam Government had virtually entered into a military alliance with the United States in violation of the Geneva Agreement, as the setting up of the US Military Command in Saigon had shown. Violation of Geneva Agreement or not, the US Government was committed to support the South Vietnam Government and President Diem in every respect.
In addition to the US troops, some military experts from Malaya have been helping the South Vietnam Government in training troops in anti-guerrilla and psychological warfare. Military advisers from various SEATO countries have been active in South Vietnam. The Australian Government had sent some crack Australian jungle troops to South Vietnam to support the US troops. (57-8) * * * V. Democratic Freedoms
Soon after the establishment of civil authority, the conflict entered the second stage where the authorities in charge of the administration South of the Provisional Demarcation Line followed a conscious, deliberate political policy to weed out undesirable elements from the local administration. The South Vietnam authorities drew up detailed plans for a "civic action" organization to reach down through the provinces and districts and to the village level. During the resistance movement, most of the administrative organizations were manned by local populations who were sympathizers of the People's Army. The authorities felt that they could never establish their absolute control over the civil administration as long as the sympathizers of the People's Army remained in any of the local organizations. The very presence of a trained People's Army cadre, a former resistance worker, was considered as a potential danger to the authority of South Vietnam and suspected of subversive activities by the Authorities.
In this process of getting rid of undesirable elements a number of former resistance workers and sympathizers of the People's Army were arrested and detained without any trial. The arrest and detention of 21 prominent members of the Movement for Defense of Peace in Saigon during this period on suspicion that these intellectuals were supporters of the People's Army was considered to be a preventive act by the authorities. The authorities organized elections to the local village councils to fill them up with their own supporters as a part of their plan. During this stage, certain political murders also took place, but mostly it was arrests and tortures that attracted attention of the International Commission. After carrying on various investigations, the International Commission felt that there was a systematic plan to violate the provisions of Article 14 of the Geneva Agreement.
At this stage it would be useful to consider the implication of Article 14 of the Geneva Agreement. Every clash between the authorities and the population or every murder or arrest in Vietnam is not necessarily in violation of the Geneva Agreement. But the guarantee given by the Geneva Agreement is that there should be no reprisal or discrimination against individuals or groups falling under the category of persons who during the hostilities had taken part in political activities, and had since then done nothing. In the case of persons who were resistance workers and who after the cessation of hostilities did something illegal, the authorities would be perfectly justified in proceeding against them, according to the prevalent law of the land and Article 14(c) would not be attracted in such cases unless there was discrimination in the procedure merely because of the fact that these persons were resistance workers during the hostilities.
The French High Command had complained that several secret arms and ammunition depots had been discovered in Central Vietnam and they had alleged that these were left behind by the People's Army at the time of their withdrawal in order to assist local sympathizers to carry out subversive activities against the new authority. They further alleged that there were in existence, in this area, organizations working for the Democratic Republic of Vietnam including Committees of Resistance and Administration and Assassination Committees which were engaged, since the ceasefire, in acts aimed at interfering with the existing administration. They claimed that the authorities of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam were interfering in the local administration in the French Union zone through these secret organizations in violation of the provisions of the Geneva Agreement. The International Commission decided to treat these charges and countercharges as two aspects of the same problem and sent a mobile team to investigate in order to obtain an objective appreciation of the situation in this area. As a result of these investigations, the Commission found that there were 110 political prisoners detained in Quang Tri Jail on the admission of the authorities themselves. All these persons were detained under the executive ordinances as a preventive action and none of them had been given an opportunity to appear before any judicial body to defend themselves. The charges levelled against them were of vague character and the action taken by the authorities in Quang Tri was arbitrary and not in conformity with the specific guarantees given under the Geneva Agreement.
Regarding the French High Command's complaint that ammunition dumps and arms depots had been left behind by the People's Army intentionally for subversive purposes, the Commission's team examined the cases of seven such discoveries in province of Quang Tri. Even though the dumps were actually discovered, the local authorities failed to provide evidence that they were left by the People's Army with specific subversive intentions. On the other hand, the International Commission confirmed that these dumps consisted of discarded and worn out materials which were not capable of any use and they came to the conclusion that the charge made by the French Union Forces so far as they relate to Quang Tri province had not been proved. [After this inquiry further investigations in other provinces of similar charges were dropped because the French High Command felt that further investigations would not serve any useful purpose.]
In connection with the supervision of the implementation of Article 14 of the Geneva Agreement in South Vietnam the International Commission had encountered difficulties from the very beginning. It started with the refusal of the local authorities in Nha Trang to allow the Commission's Team to investigate in that area on the ground that it was an internal matter, the area in which the incident occurred being not one of the areas transferred to their control under the Geneva Agreement. In addition to this, there were other types of difficulties such as refusal to guarantee non-reprisals against witnesses appearing before the Teams, and refusal to provide security to the People's Army Liaison Officer and Teams.
The third stage in the process of establishment of normal conditions in the regroupment zone South of the Provisional Demarcation line started with the campaign for the "systematic extermination of communists" sponsored by the Government of the State of Vietnam as a political policy. Tremendous propaganda was built up by the national as well as local authorities against the communists, and people were asked to denounce communists. All over the country anti-communist weeks were celebrated and press and radio had been active with "catch a communist" slogan. The Government made it perfectly clear that the communists are their "enemy Number 1." As a result of the heat engendered by all this propaganda, a new crop of incidents took place all over South Vietnam. A number of political murders remained unsolved mysteries and people knowing the Government's anti-communist policy tried to settle private quarrels wither by denouncing or by indulging in murders.
As a matter of fact, the particular ideologies which the authorities in either zone were trying to promote is not covered by the Geneva Agreement. Any punitive action of political leanings against persons who did not participate in the resistance movement would not attract the provisions of Article 14(c) of the Geneva Agreement. The International Commission can interfere only when, in the pursuit of any particular ideology, the parties victimize a discriminate against some persons for their activities during the hostilities. This is the legal position. But actually, most of the people who were killed or arrested were claimed by the People's Army High Command as former resistance workers against whom the southern authorities were taking reprisals. The International Commission could not investigate most of the allegations because of the independent attitude taken by the Government of South Vietnam which controlled the civil administration and which had not signed the Geneva Agreement. This attitude made the obstructions and difficulties progressively more severe and the French High Command could not take adequate remedial action.
however, it is surprising to find the South Vietnam authorities taking preventive action by eliminating all those people who did not support them in view of specific provisions in the Geneva Agreement which visualize the possibility of some persons who supported the "wrong" side during the hostilities remaining in the other zone. Added to this, the authorities in each zone were given the administration on trust, as it were, pending the political settlement which would bring about the unification of the country. So, unless one party completely gave up the idea of unification unilaterally and determined to make the Provisional Demarcation Line a permanent dividing line, there is no question of eliminating undesirable elements or enemies in the State from the regroupment area. Soon after the ceasefire in Vietnam, the political situation in South Vietnam was most uncertain and confused. But as they gained in strength it became extremely difficult to guarantee democratic freedoms to people living in the South of the Provisional Demarcation Line.
North of the Provisional Demarcation Line, there was no problem of reprisals against former resistance workers because not many political workers supported the French against the People's Army during the hostilities. Even if there had been some, they had changed their zone of residence before the regroupment was completed. Those who were working in the French administration and preferred to stay on in the North stayed back in their previous jobs to help the administration. 65-9) * * * VI. Refugees from the North
. . . During the freedom struggle the majority of Catholics in Vietnam made common cause with the Viet Minh Government of 1946 and the four Vietnamese bishops appealed to the Pope to support Vietnamese independence. The Government of Ho Chi Minh was very careful of Catholic sensibility and preached tolerance of all religions. However, the Catholic villages were virtually the only organized groups to exist outside the Vietnamese Government and over a period of time the Dioceses of Phat Diem and Bui Chu in Central Tonkin, where Catholics were numerous, gradually assumed a semi-autonomous status and began to train and arm their own militia. [The total Catholic population of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia is 1,650,000 out of which 1,200,000 Catholics lived in North Vietnam.]
Ho Chi Minh's Government in 1946 named Le Huu Tu, bishop of Phat Diem, its Supreme Adviser after Bao Dai left for China. Even though the revolution had been marked by a wholesale overthrow of the old village councils and their replacement by supporters of the Viet Minh in other sections of the country, in the Catholic areas, the Viet Minh had left intact the village committees and the Catholic hierarchy. However, the Viet Minh had become more demanding with the passage of time and had insisted on introducing their own men into the Government of even largely Catholic villages. This had become a matter of serious concern for Le Huu Tu, and when Bao Dai invited him in October 1949 to accept his authority, the Bishop agreed. Bao Dai followed the example of Ho Chi Minh and appointed the Bishop of Phat Diem as his representative in the area. Le Huu Tu had maintained wide freedom of action and his regime and that of the Bishop of Bui Chu remained autonomous under Bao Dai. They raised their own troops and ruled their own domains holding both civil and religious powers in their own hands. At that time, the Viet Minh had seen no reason deliberately to antagonize the Catholic community.
However, the Catholics who lived outside Phat Diem and Bui Chu had no political organization or had no special political position. A number of them continued to live in Viet Minh areas generally abstaining from political activity. Some others were tacitly encouraged by their bishops to organize "local self-defense" militia against the Viet Minh with arms supplied by the French. [Ellen J. Hammer, Struggle for Indochina, p. 285.]
The People's Army of Vietnam occupied the south zone of the Red River Delta including Phat Diem, Thai Binh, Ninh Binh and Nam Dinh on June 30, 1954. It became extremely difficult for the bishops of Phat Diem and Bui Chu to continue their autonomous status under the changed conditions. They, along with their followers, preferred to move to the French controlled zone to living under the communist regime.
In September 1954, sporadic complaints had been received by the International Commission from individual petitioners about obstacles to free movement from North to South. Matters came to a head when the French High Command on October 6, 1954, endorsed a complaint made by the South Vietnam Government alleging that obstacles were being placed by the authorities of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam on the free movement of evacuees in the areas of Phat Diem, Bui Chu, Nam Dinh, Thai Binh, Ninh Binh and Phu Ly in the Red River Delta. The International Commission treated this particular representation as significant and urgent because of political considerations. Till then, the South Vietnam Government had dissociated itself from the General Agreement and this representation was the first official gesture on their part of showing a little more cooperative attitude towards the International Commission. Hence the Commission decided to investigate the complaint so as to ensure the future cooperation of the South Vietnam Government.
The Commission had, as a short-term measure, sent inspection teams to Nam Dinh and Phat Diem. In the Phat Diem area, the Commission's team found an abnormal situation and a concentration of people which blocked normal administrative processes dealing with facilities in connection with the exercise of the right of freedom of movement. The Team found, in addition, that the machinery fro giving permits and providing transport facilities was not adequate to deal with the situation. About 10,000 refugees congregated particularly in the compound of the cemetery, cathedral and convent in Phat Diem. The Commission's team, which was temporarily helped by the visit of the Freedoms Committee of the Commission, assisted the local administration in working out special and detailed administrative arrangements to meet the abnormal situation. The arrangements included creation of special permit offices in places where evacuees had congregated and delegation of powers to local authorities to grant permits.
On the suggestion of the International Commission, the local authorities also made arrangements for distribution of food and medical aid to the refugees and for making necessary arrangements to transport the evacuees from Phat Diem to the French zone of the Haiphong perimeter. As a result of these arrangements, which began functioning on November 12, 1954, approximately 10,800 permits had been issued to people to move South till November 25, 1954. During the course of 10 days 8,268 refugees were transported by motorboats from Phat Diem to Xa-trung in the French zone. The dispersal of the concentration at Phat Diem and the speedy arrangements made at the instance of the International Commission for the evacuation of refugees was no doubt one of the major achievements of the Commission during its period of work. (72-5) . . . In the meantime, on September 8, 1954, the Chief of the People's Army Delegation on the Central Joint Commission, General Dung, complained of forced evacuation of people from the North by the French Union Forces which "had compelled a large number of people to leave their homes and had terrorized those who opposed these evacuations." When the first mobile team of the International Commission visited Nam Dinh in November 1954, the team found no evidence of any person wishing to go South being obstructed or hindered by the authorities but received a great number of petitions alleging that the French authorities and the Church authorities had exercised pressure on certain persons to move to the South. A number of people alleged in their petitions that their relatives wanted to come North and were being prevented from doing so by the authorities in the South.
A number of complaints were sent to the International Commission alleging that a number of persons had moved or were desiring to move from North to South as a result of unfair pressure put on them by the agents of the French High Command. These refugees, they said, had been forcibly evacuated to the South. They further alleged that thousands of persons in the refugee camps in the South were victims of systematic propaganda and many of them wished to go back to the zone of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.
The international Commission undertook investigations in the refugee camps in Thua Thien and Bien Hoa provinces in South Vietnam. The investigations were delayed due to hostile demonstrations accompanied by violence by the refugees against the personnel of the teams and the need to make adequate security arrangements. When the team visited on February 18, 1955, the refugee camp in Lac An, 20 kms north of Saigon, the refugees and their children hurled clay clods at them. On March 7, 1955, when the mobile team of the International Commission visited the refugee center of Doc Mo, north of Bien Hoa province, where more than 12,000 refugees were resettled, the refugees "surrounded the visiting team, insulted the Viet Minh delegates (Liaison Officers) with an ever increasing threatening attitude. Luckily, Bishop Pham Ngoc Chi of Bui Chu intervened and dispersed the refugees, but the team was forced to abandon the investigation." [From Duoc Viet, Saigon Press Roundup, March 10, 1955.] (79-80) . . . There was an opinion that there should be no permit system and the people should be allowed to leave the zone without formally requesting the authorities for permission to do so. After careful consideration of this question, the International Commission came to the conclusion that it was not practicable to abolish the permit system on either side of the 17th Parallel. It was known, as a matter of fact, that nobody in Vietnam could move from one province to the other even under the French regime without a permit. Nobody was allowed from the South to the North also without a permit. In this connection it was made clear that the International Commission could not support any unauthorized and panicky action particularly in defiance of the administrative authorities of the area and on whose shoulders the responsibility for excess of action or inaction must be squarely placed. The Commission wanted the implementation of Article 14(d) in an organized orderly fashion by compelling the party concerned to carry out the provisions of the Geneva Agreement and not by irresponsible panicky moves. (81) . . . It is an extremely delicate task to try to analyze the motives for such a human problem. Propaganda purposes apart, any attempt at an objective appreciation of the situation is very difficult. The causes of the exodus may be analyzed under psychological, economic, political and religious considerations. As far as psychological reasons are concerned, most of the people left their homes in the North because of fear of reprisals fro their support to the French against the People's Army during the hostilities.
There was general panic in the North as the situation was so confused and the people's minds were dominated by fear. Added to this, the herd instinct in them played a prominent part. Most of the people left because their neighbors in the village left and their leaders and priests left and asked them to leave. A large number of people decided to leave because of a vague fear of atomic attack on the North. The International Commission's Teams came across a great number of people who really believed that if they remained in the North, the Americans would drop atom bombs.
The question of choosing a zone of residence was intimately connected with the individual mind and fears that operated on that mind. In this connection, it may be useful to realize that the refugee exodus in Vietnam was different from that of any other similar movement of people in history. In recent years, the refugee movement between India and Pakistan and the problem of Arab refugees from Palestine took place because of partition and consequent violence. Whereas in Vietnam, no permanent division was visualized and the people were given a chance to choose their zone of residence after the cessation of hostilities. There was no violence, killings or war, but as a political concession to the parties tot he Agreement, the people of Vietnam were given the choice to be exercised in peaceful conditions.
As far as economic reasons were concerned, it was common knowledge that in Vietnam, the exodus had been there every year from North to South even before the Geneva Agreement. The peasants and workers wanted to leave because of better economic prospects in the South. They moved from the North in great numbers every year to find work in plantations in the South and returned for the harvest season. A large number of middle class businessmen left the North as they felt that private enterprise could not survive in a communist State. Added to this, the closing down of the French firms, commercial concerns and other industries and the evacuation of the employees, forced most of the people to evacuate from the North. Most of the laborers were persuaded or forced to evacuate from the North for the purposes of having cheap labor for rubber plantations in the South. [Truth on the Affairs of Refugees in Vietnam, Foreign Language Publishing House, Hanoi, 1955.] A number of people who got permits to go South remained in the North till the harvesting season was over. Most of them never realized that they were going to the South permanently and once they left, they could not come back. The Commission's team had to explain to the intending evacuees the exact implications of Article 14(d) and, in particular, the words "go and live." These words implied that the section covered the cases of those who wished to live permanently in the other zone and did not cover the cases of those who wished to visit the South for any other purpose.
The political reasons for the exodus of the people from North to South were obvious. Most of those who supported the French and Bao Dai during hostilities realized that they could not survive in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. All those who were lukewarm to the patriotic war left the North for fear. However, the Western press and public opinion, particularly in the United States, was convinced that these hundreds of thousand of people left North Vietnam because they hated communism. They depicted this movement as people escaping from the communist regime of heavy taxes, misery and indoctrination. They believed that the exodus constituted serious popular indictment of the Northern regime. (83-4) . . . Most of the people who had left the North were influenced in their decision by the propaganda and pressure brought about by the French on the one hand and the priests and various political agents of the South on the other. As the two parties were responsible for the implementation of Article 14(d) in their respective zones, they did their level best to work on the minds of the individuals. Those who made up their minds left the North while the French were in control of certain areas in the North. Those people who were on the margin, who did not make up their minds one way or the other, were constantly worked on by the local authorities, the priests and the local leaders. In the nature of things that was bound to happen and there was nothing in the Geneva Agreement to prohibit the parties from indulging in propaganda in favor of Article 14(d) on war or the other. Added to this, people made up their minds slowly and having made up their minds changed subsequently. (85) . . . Those who expressed a wish to go North experienced a certain amount of difficulty in the beginning. Demonstrations were held in front of the International Commission's Headquarters at Saigon on two occasions and refugees, while admitting that they were granted permits, stated that adequate transport facilities had not been provided. On the intervention of the international Commission with the French High Command, arrangements were made to transport 1,033 by ship to the North on May 30, 1955. (88) . . . During the discussion on the extension of facilities for freedom of movement, two important disagreements came out clearly between the two parties. The first point of disagreement was in regard to supervision by the International Commission of the implementation of Article 14(d) after May 18, 1955. The People's Army High Command contended that the International Commission could not exercise any of the supervisory powers in this respect as the contemplated extension of facilities did not fall under the purview of the Geneva Agreement. It was true that under Article 14(d), neither the Commission nor its teams were given task after the expiry of the 300-day time limit. However, the structure of the Geneva Agreement was such that the Commission's power of supervision of any working arrangement agreed to by the parties regarding the implementation of the Agreement was undisputed. Under Article 36 of the Agreement, the Commission had the general task of the supervision of the implementation of the various provisions of the Agreement by both sides.
The second point of disagreement was regarding the affording of facilities to those who had already once changed their zone of residence to return to the original zone for one reason or another. According to the French High Command it was not within the scope of the Geneva Agreement to offer return trips to people from South to North or vice versa in respect of those who had already made their choice. While agreeing that certain exceptions could be made, General de Beaufort, Chief of the French Liaison mission, insisted that the parties were under no obligation to provide facilities for such return trips. Undoubtedly, in the case of people wishing to exercise the right under Article 14(d) to go and live in the other zone, choice had normally to be made finally and once only and the authorities had to assist in the movement. Nevertheless, the International Commission came to the conclusion that political situations or commercial and allied considerations might compel the people to change their minds and it was, therefore, essential to give such persons one chance of returning to their original zone of residence. In such cases, the authorities were asked to give assistance provided that such assistance was not claimed more than once from the authority of a particular party.
During the extended period about 5,000 persons went from North to South and 1,671 came from South to North. Many evacuees who had come to the North had sent petitions to the International Commission that there were still a large number of refugees awaiting permits and transport facilities in the South. Allegations were also made that families were being separated and arrests were taking place. The reports received by the International Commission from its office in Saigon showed that permits and facilities were not given to about 4,000 persons who wanted to go North. Concerning the increase in the number of persons who wanted to move from the South and go and live in the zone under the command of the People's Army during the period of extension, the International Commission came to the conclusion that it was due to fear of reprisals or discrimination in view of the anti-Geneva Agreement and anti-communist propaganda taken up by South Vietnam during June-July 1955. (89-90) . . . There was a great deal of criticism in the Western Press that the International Commission had failed to ensure that every person in Vietnam had exercised his right of option under the provisions of the Geneva Agreement. In view of the fact that the French High Command did not ask for an extension of the time limit for freedom of movement after May 18, 1955, it was surprising to find a charge levelled against the International Commission that it "proved unable to safeguard the right of refugees to leave the North freely." The reluctance of the French High Command to ask for any further extension of freedom of movement was understandable for two reasons: they must have been prompted by the movement of refugees in the reverse direction, i.e. from South to North. Secondly, they felt that a number of "agents" were being included by the Democratic Republic authorities among the refugees going South who would interfere with the peaceful resettlement of refugees and in the civil administration in the South. There was no proof either to substantiate or contradict the information but the French High Command was convinced that such a thing would be most probable in view of the way in which the evacuees were transported in the thousands from the North and were received without any question in the South. [This question did not come under any Article of the Geneva Agreement and hence the International Commission did not consider it.]
According to the Geneva Agreement, on May 18, 1955, the right of any civilian to make a choice of zone of residence and the corresponding liabilities of the parties came to an end. The facilities for freedom of movement were extended up to July 20, 1955, without any formal amendment to the Geneva Agreement. The International Commission was not in a position to do anything for those who did not make their choice before May 18 or July 20. In actual fact, therefore, on July 20, 1955, the question of freedom of movement should have been closed. However,in view of the complexity of the problem and the difficulties experienced by the Commission, by the parties and by the people, the International Commission, in consultation with the parties decided to follow up certain residual cases where persons had expressed their desire to move to the other zone before July 20, to satisfy itself that the spirit and letter of Article 14(d) had been adequately carried out. . . .
The International Commission expressed a hope to follow up these residual matters but felt that "in view of the definite stand taken by the Government of the State of Vietnam against the Geneva Agreement, and the strained relations between the parties," the Commission did not expect any spectacular results. (91-2) * * * VII. Ho Chi Minh's Success
As soon as the regroupment process was completed, the political and administrative control in the two regrouping zones on both sides of the Demarcation Line were taken over by the established civil governments in both zones. The complete identity of the High Command of the People's Army of Vietnam with that of the civil authorities of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam helped them in implementing the provisions of the Agreement in their area. The situation in the South gave rise to a number of complications in the effective implementation of the various provisions of the Geneva Agreement by the French Union High Command in the zone allotted to them because of the independent attitude taken by the State of Vietnam to whom civil administration had been transferred by the French.
. . .In October 1944, Ho Chi Minh entered Indochina from China with a few hundred of his followers and established his headquarters in the province of Thai Nguyen in the North. By March 1945 insurrection had spread over all the neighboring provinces of Bac Kan, Tuyen Quang, Bac Giang and the northern territories of Lang Son, Cao Bang and Ha Giang. This was achieved mostly by the efforts of the People's Liberation Army which was formed by Vo Nguyen Giap out of the small resistance group that was set up in Bac Son and in Cao Bang in 1940. The story of the creation of the People's Liberation Army of Vietnam is a most interesting and fascinating aspect of the Vietnamese struggle for independence.
With a view to pushing forward the program of armed operations, Ho Chi Minh instructed the cadres to create the Vietnamese People's Propaganda Units for national liberation as the foundation stone for the revolutionary army. Vo Nguyen Giap was entrusted with this task. The first platoon of the Vietnamese People's Army, initially called the Vietnamese People's Propaganda unit for national liberation and afterwards the Tran Hung Dao platoon, was created on December 22, 1944, in the jungles of Cao Bang province. It consisted of 34 men and was equipped with two revolvers, 17 rifles, 14 flintlock rifles and one light machine gun. The platoon swelled afterwards to a company thus extending the people's base and paving the way for the building up of a larger guerrilla force.
The Vietnamese People's Propaganda Company launched a number of attacks in Cao Bang province against the French troops and set up revolutionary management in the localities of Cho Ra and Cho Den. These military units were named People's Liberation Troops. In the middle of April 1945 the Central Committee of the Indochinese communist party convened a revolutionary military conference and laid down the tasks of increasing guerrilla activities and the setting up of a Vietnamese People's liberation Committee for the attainment of provisional government. All the people's armed forces were grouped under the single name of Vietnamese People's Liberation Army. By 1945 the People's Liberation Troops had grown to 50,000 and soon after the establishment of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in September 1945 the name of the Vietnamese People's Liberation Army was changed to that of Vietnamese People's Army. Thus within a short period the Vietnamese people's Revolutionary Armed Forces had, from a platoon operating in a narrow mountainous area, been swelled to a full national army whose activities extended throughout the country. By 1950, the Vietnamese people's Army had gradually been organized into regular troops and had advanced from conducting sporadic guerrilla attacks to large-scale military operations. (93-5) . . . A national conference was convened at Tan Tram in North Vietnam on August 15, 1945, and a national liberation committee of 10 members was formed which proclaimed general insurrection from August 19. By August 20 the capital of North Vietnam was under the control of the Viet Minh and popular committees had appeared in every village all over the country. On August 25 Bao Dai, who had formed a Government for free Vietnam under the Japanese, abdicated in favor of the Viet Minh. (96) . . . On August 29, 1945, Ho Chi Minh formed at Hanoi a Government for the whole country. On September 2, 1945, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam was proclaimed and the provisional People's Government made its first appearance before the people. President Ho Chi Minh read the Proclamation of Independence of Vietnam at the Ba Dinh square in Hanoi. The Declaration of Independence quoted from the American Declaration of independence and the French Declaration of the Rights of man and Citizens. It pointed out that State power had been wrested from the Japanese and not from the French and "our people have overthrown the monarchic regime that has reigned supreme for tens of centuries. In its place has been established the present Democratic Republic."
The provisional Government representing the whole Vietnamese people declared that "from now on we break off all relations of a colonial character with France; we repeal all the international obligations that France had so far subscribed to on behalf of Vietnam and we abolish all the special rights the French have unlawfully acquired in our Fatherland." They declared to the world that "Vietnam has a right to be a free and independent country--and that in fact it is so already."
On September 8, 1945, Ho Chi Minh, Head of the Provisional Government of the republic, signed a decree announcing general elections for a National Assembly. The elections were held in December 1945 and January 1946 on the basis of universal suffrage, granted to men an women above 18. The National Assembly met in Hanoi for the first time on March 2, 1946, and on the following day ho Chi Minh was elected President of the Republic. At the second session of the National Assembly which took place in November 1946, a constitution for the democratic republic was adopted which declared that the Republic would be a union of all the people without distinction of race, class, creed, wealth or sex, that "citizens would enjoy freedom of speech, press, assembly, religion and travel." Rights of property and free compulsory primary education were also guaranteed. Due to the armed struggle with the French the constitution could never be put into force and the real powers of the assembly were delegated to a standing committee consisting of 15 members. At its meeting on February 21-22, 1951, the Standing Committee decided "to draft a new code and amendments tot he constitution to cope with the new situation of our country and to meet the aspirations of our people." (96-8) . . . By the time the Viet Minh had established a Government at Hanoi, the KMT Chinese had occupied North Vietnam up to the 16th Parallel in accordance with the terms of the Potsdam Agreement of July 1945. The Chinese insisted that the representatives of the Rightist party should be included in the Government formed by the Viet Minh. The British who were in the South opposed the Viet Minh for their own reasons and encouraged the French. In view of the difficulties encountered by the provisional Government of the Democratic Republic, the Viet Minh had to open negotiations simultaneously with the Chinese as well as the French.
As a part of their negotiations with the Chinese, the Viet Minh signed an Agreement with the Dong Minh, one of the rightist parties, on October 23, 1945, and dissolved the Communist Party of Indochina on November 11, 1945. It further published the draft of a constitution for the country on which it invited suggestions from the public. However, these moves failed to impress the rightist parties like the VNQDD, Dong Minh and the Dai Viet, which formed a nationalist bloc named the VNQDD after its principal members. There were riots and clashes between the Viet Minh and the VNQDD but finally a joint meeting convened by the Chinese on November 19 decided that a "National Union Government should be set up consisting of all the parties and their private militia should be combined to form one National Army."
On February 24, 1946, the Vietnamese Rightist party signed an agreement with the Viet Minh which set up in March 1946 a Government of "Union and Resistance" consisting of 10 Ministers with Ho Chi Minh as the President and Nguyen-Hai-Than of the Dong Minh as the Vice-President. Finance, Communications, public Works, Justice and Education remained under the Viet Minh and the Democratic Party. Foreign Affairs, national Economy, Agriculture and Social Affairs were handed over to the VNQDD and the Dong Minh. Interior and national defense were placed in the hands of non-party men. The overall control over defense was entrusted to a resistance Committee of 9 members under the Chairmanship of General Giap. On all matters the Government was to be advised by a group of councilors presided over by Bao Dai.
This all party government signed an agreement with France which gave Vietnam self-government. This Agreement was signed on March 6, 1946, in the presence of British, American and Chinese observers. Both Ho Chi Minh and Vu Hong Kanh representing the Viet Minh and the VNQDD signed on behalf of Vietnam. The main terms of the Agreement were that:
(1) France recognizes the Republic of Vietnam (comprising Tonkin and Annam) as a free State with its own Government, Parliament, Finance and Army, but forming part of the Indochinese Federation in the French Union;
(2) The unification of Cochin-China with Tonkin and Annam would be decided by a referendum;
(3) French Army would stay in Vietnam after the evacuation of the Chinese; and
(4) Future Franco-Vietnamese negotiations would determine the exact status of Vietnam in the French Union and that of the French citizens in Vietnam and the diplomatic rights of the country.
Even though the Agreement gave Vietnam only self-government but not independence, France under the Agreement recognized the Democratic Republic of Vietnam as a legal personality under international law. It was agreed on all sides that this convention was provisional in character and that it was meant as a basis of future negotiations on two fundamental points of complete independence and unity of Vietnam. The French wanted to reestablish their hold on Vietnam and make as few concessions to Vietnam as possible. To the Viet Minh, on the other hand, the Agreement was a political expedient in order to save and ultimately to strengthen their infant State. But the all-party Government was too weak and divided to be effective. Within it the Viet Minh were raised against the VNQDD. Being essentially nationalistic the VNQDD, the Dong Minh and the Dai Viet were against the re-entry of the French. Therefore, they looked up to Koumintang China against the French. This was made clear in the announcement made by Nguyen Tuong Tam, the VNQDD Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam on March 12, 1946. Thus the Franco-Vietnamese Agreement of March 6, 1946, was threatened in the North by the South by the French who were encouraging separatism by setting up on March 26 a provisional Government of their Republic of Cochin-China in direct contravention of the Agreement.
The Viet Minh reacted differently in each area. They started negotiations with the French about the stationing of their troops in the North. The French on their part were willing to negotiate mainly because they wanted to eliminate the Koumintang as a factor in the political life of Vietnam. A Convention was signed on April 3, 1946, by which (a) the number of French soldiers north of the 16th Parallel was fixed at 15,000; (b) the French soldiers were restricted to the six towns of Hanoi, Haiphong, Hongay, Nam Dinh, Hue, Tourane, Haidung, Dien Bien Phu and the posts along the Chinese frontier; (c) the frontier posts were to be defended by a fixed proportion of French and Viet Minh troops; (d) the French were to notify their movements to the Viet Minh Government 48 hours in advance; and (e) a joint central committee of liaison and control was formed at Hanoi to execute the Convention. (99-101) . . . On July 19, 1947, General Giap was dropped from the Government and was made the Commander-in-Chief of the People's Army. The Defense portfolio was entrusted to Ta Guang Buu, a non-party man. In all, out of 27 members of the Government, three were members of the Viet Minh, four democrats, four socialists, two nationalists, three Catholics, one Buddhist, eight independents and two ex-Mandarins. Bao Dai (then known as citizen Vinh Thuy) was re-appointed the Supreme Political Adviser. [Devillers, Histoire Du Vietnam, p. 401.] In August 1949 Pham van Dong was made the Vice-President of the Government and Chairman of the Supreme Council of National Defense. (103) . . . The Democratic Republic sent its Delegation to the nine-Power Geneva Conference in May 1954 headed by Mr. Pham van Dong, Vice-President and Foreign Minister of the Democratic Republic, to negotiate peace in Indochina. Mr. Pham van Dong with his clever handling of the situation consolidated the gains secured by General Giap and his party in the field of fighting in the international diplomatic field. After the conclusion of the Geneva Agreement the People's Army occupied the territory up to the 17th parallel in Vietnam and established its civil administration in a most efficient manner. (105) . . . With a view to strengthening his friendship with Soviet Russia and China and to secure much needed economic aid, Ho Chi Minh visited China and the Soviet Union from June 22 to July 22, 1955. He was accompanied by Truong Chinh, General Secretary of the Vietnam Lao Dong Party, and Ministers for Finance, Industry and Commerce, Education and Agriculture, and Vice-Ministers for foreign Affairs, Public Health and the Director of the Presidency. As a result of negotiations between Ho Chi Minh and the authorities of the People's Republic of China, the latter agreed to present to the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam eight hundred million Chinese Yuan. The gift was to be utilized for rebuilding railways, river docks, highways and bridges, restore and construct textile mills, tanneries, medical equipment factories, agricultural equipment factories and paper mills in Vietnam. China also agreed to help Vietnam in designing and constructing factories, railways and highways and also to dispatch technical personnel to Vietnam. At the same time, Vietnam would send its workers as apprentices to certain enterprises in China. The two countries further agreed to expand their mutual trade on the basis of equality and mutual benefit.
During his six day visit to the Soviet Union, ho Chi Minh negotiated a trade agreement with the Russians. With a view to rehabilitating the economy of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the Soviet Government had allocated four hundred million rubles as a gift. They had agreed to help in the restoration and construction of 25 Vietnamese industrial and communal enterprises. The Soviet Government agreed to help the Democratic Republic in training Vietnamese specialists in higher technical educational establishments in the Soviet Union and in organizing the training of specialists in the educational establishments of Vietnam. They further promised to help in geological survey work and in setting up medical centers.
On his return from his trip to China and the Soviet Union, Ho Chi Minh expressed his gratitude to the friendly countries which helped the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and expressed his confidence that "with the assistance of the friendly countries, we feel stronger in the struggle to consolidate peace, achieve unity by free general elections, complete independence and democracy throughout the country." He declared at a mass rally held on July 23, 1955, in Hanoi to welcome his Delegation that "our country is a member of the great family of democratic and socialist countries with a population of more than nine hundred million."
While these developments were taking place in North Vietnam, the French Government was still trying to make up its mind about the possibilities of coexistence with Ho Chi Minh. Only in October 1955 the French Republic decided to negotiate a trade agreement with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. After prolonged discussions, a trade agreement and an agreement on payments were signed on October 14, 1955, in Hanoi between the economic experts of the two countries. These Agreements were concluded for a period of one year and could be renewed by agreement between the two Governments.
Under the provisions of the Trade Agreement, the Democratic republic of Vietnam agreed to deliver to French authorities raw silk, agricultural products, forest products, handicrafts, lacquered articles, etc. France in turn would supply machines, spare parts and accessories, textiles, tourist cars and bicycles, pharmaceutical products, chemicals, building materials and ironwares, etc. These commercial exchanges for each country were valued at one milliard French francs. Under the terms of Agreement on Payments, the National Bank of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in Hanoi and the Bank of France have agreed to open reciprocal accounts in French francs without interest which would permit the settlement of the payment of goods exchanged between the two countries as well as all other settlements to be reached by common agreement between the two Governments.
The cultural experts of the Sainteny Mission negotiated an Agreement with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam regarding the retention of French cultural institutions in their territory. As a result of this, there are still French teachers, doctors and scientists at the University of Hanoi, at Lycee, at the Cancer institute, and at the Ecole d'Extreme-Orient. The Democratic Republic of Vietnam made it perfectly clear that they stood for the establishment and development of diplomatic, economic and cultural relations with France on the principle of equality and mutual benefit. (109-12) * * * VIII. Creation of the State of Vietnam
. . . On May 31, 1948, Bao Dai formed a provisional Central Government for Vietnam with General Nguyen van Xuan as the head. The first ordinance issued by the new regime of South Vietnam provided that, "because of the present state of war, the exercise of sovereignty by the Vietnamese people, who are the source of all legal power, is suspended." The new Government was expected "to negotiate with France, restore peace, organize public power and prepare, when possible, for elections to a constituent assembly charged with elaborating the future Constitution of Vietnam."
As a result of negotiations between the French and Bao Dai, a Joint Declaration was signed on June 5, 1948, in the Bay of Along by M. Emile Ballaert, High Commissioner for France in Indochina, and General Nguyen van Xuan, by which France recognized the independence and unity of Vietnam as a State associated with France in the French Union. It was agreed that the representatives of the two sides should discuss various special and appropriate arrangements concerning cultural, military, economic, financial and technical matters. The French High Commissioner counted on the Along Bay Declaration to cut the ground politically from under Ho Chi Minh, "making it impossible for the Viet Minh to continue the fight in the name of nationalism." They insisted at the Along Bay meeting on a single foreign policy and a unified army for the entire French Union. (113-14) . . . In foreign affairs, Vietnam could send representatives abroad only with the consent of the French Government to places specified after joint consultation, and could negotiate with foreign countries on certain matters previously agreed to by the French Government. The general lines of foreign policy were to be laid down by the High Council of the French Union. These restrictions were rather serious. However, on June 14, 1949, Bao Dai announced the establishment of the new State of Vietnam. He announced his intention of retaining provisionally the title of Emperor "in order to have legal international position but," he said, "I solemnly proclaim that the future constitution of Vietnam will be decided by the people who have heroically fought for the independence of their homeland." In the meantime, he declared himself Chief of State. (115) . . . The Elysee Palace Agreement of March 8 was implemented by a series of conventions signed at Saigon on December 13, 1949, transferring to the Government of the State of Vietnam all internal administrative authority. In this connection, the French President sent a message to Bao Dai stating that "Vietnam's national aspirations, as originally formulated by the Viet Minh leader, Ho Chi Minh, had all been met" and that "France would protect Vietnam against any attack from without, if necessary, with the aid of the United Nations." (115) . . . Once the foundations for an autonomous Vietnam were laid, the need to secure support and cooperation of other anti-communist parties so as to build up a strong State became urgent. Prime Minister Tran van Huu opened up negotiations with various groups. In this connection, it is interesting to note that in spite of the declared unity of Vietnam, all the three Cabinets since 1949 had been led by and consisted of men from Cochin-China only as distinct from Annam and Tonkin in the North. It is essential to remember that the State of Vietnam was a creation of the French for their own reasons and came into being as a result of negotiations but not of any movement for national liberation. in its origins, it had a negative purpose to serve as an instrument of French policy to counter Ho Chi Minh's nationalist fight for independence. Because of this reason, the Franco-Vietnamese Agreement failed to rally round Bao Dai most of the anti-communist nationalist groups in Vietnam. (116-17) . . . . . . The politico-social sects like Cao Dai, Hoa Hao and Binh Xuyen in South Vietnam . . . formed States within a State controlling some of the richest provinces of South Vietnam. All attempts by Prime Minister Tam to dissolve these armed forces and incorporate them into the National Army had been resisted by Bao Dai, for in an age when feudalism in Asia was fast disappearing, his fate was intimately linked with theirs. A similar identity of interest brought into their group the Dai Viet led by Nguyen Huu Tri, Governor of North Vietnam, numbering 5,000 consisting mostly of mandarins and Government officials. The Catholics of Phat Diem led by Le Huu Tu in North Vietnam had a small autonomous administration of their own with their private army run by a subvention from the Central Government. As long as the National Government remained militarily weak it had to depend on the private armies of the feudal groups thereby diminishing its own authority. In addition to these complications, the Government suffered from two basic handicaps of being usually referred to as a creation of a French group in Saigon and of being composed of mediocre persons arbitrarily chosen by Bao Dai without any political support from the people. (119-20) * * * IX. Ngo Dinh Diem's Rise to Power
The Americans, who took more and more interest in South Vietnam as a part of their anti-communist crusade in the world, pressed the French to give complete independence to Vietnam to enable them to counter the nationalist claims of the Democratic Republic. When France promised complete independence just before the Geneva Conference on Indochina, the Americans looked for a nationalist Vietnamese leader who could rally the anti-communist nationalist elements in Vietnam. They were convinced that Bao Dai could no longer be depended upon in their fight against communism. As far back as 1952, US Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas wrote that one Mr. Ngo Dinh Diem, brother of a Catholic bishop who was studying American democracy at Maryknoll College, Lakewood, New Jersey, "is revered by the Vietnamese because he is honest and independent and stood firm against the French influence," should be the right man to be supported as a good bet in Vietnamese politics. The Americans urged the French to prevail upon Bao Dai to dismiss Prince Buu Luc. Mr. Ngo Dinh Diem was appointed Prime Minister on June 17, 1954.
This step marked a clear victory for the nationalists and committed the United States directly in Vietnam. Diem formed his first Cabinet on July 7, 1954, from amongst the intellectual leaders he knew and trusted, preferably his family members. Bao Dai, the Chief of State, was prevailed upon to confer full powers on Diem and to leave a clear field to enable him to succeed in his political program at the most critical period of Vietnam's history. Consequently, Bao Dai stayed in France since the end of the Geneva Conference in July 1954.
With the conclusion of the Geneva Agreement, which divided Vietnam provisionally at the 17th Parallel, the country needed a real nationalist leader and in Diem found an ardent nationalist. Diem took over the Government of the State of Vietnam at a very critical stage. He inherited a State which was in the abyss and to call it a State was flattery at that time. Within four months of the assuming of office by Diem, near anarchy reigned in South Vietnam. The Army rebelled against the Government and rejected its orders. The feudal groups with their private armies opposed Diem, both inside and outside the Government. Binh Xuyen sect, which controlled the police service of Saigon-Cholon, regarded him as an arch-enemy. Hemmed in by antagonists, the Government controlled little more than its own ministerial buildings. To make matters worse, there were acute divisions in the Vietnamese Government; quarrels between Bao Dai and Diem, between the military and civil authorities and various armed political groups. France and the United States did not see eye to eye on the best means of coping with this confusion.
Diem's tackling of the situation in the initial stages created a great deal of antagonism and public criticism. His heavy reliance on his family members, particularly his brothers, who largely comprised the Government, was detested. He earned widespread animosity because of his tendency to give preference to his family members and his native Tonkinese friends over the Cochin-Chinese nationalists. His close identification with Roman Catholicism in a Buddhist country where Catholics were only a small minority of the population was another cause of displeasure. Added to all these difficulties, Diem's Government proved to be inept, inefficient and unpopular. Diem, suspecting almost everyone, insisted on checking every little thing himself. He insisted that the men he would bring into his Government must be completely under his orders. However, he did not dare install political freedom for fear of anarchic centrifugal forces ripping the State apart. Diem tried to be dictatorial but in the beginning proved a very ineffective dictator. Such a situation left everything in a condition of "moral paralysis." It was felt that "one cannot counter the mystique of communism with unborn democracy and ineffective dictatorship." [C.L. Sulzberger, New York Times, March 12, 1955.] (125-6) . . . . . . In September 1952 General Nguyen van Hinh submitted a new plan which envisaged the formation of a few heavily equipped companies and the creation of 54 light anti-guerrilla battalions each consisting of 700 men charged with the task of "pacification." He wanted that these battalions should be modelled not after the French but the Viet Minh Army. They were to be popular in composition (consisting of local Vietnamese) and autonomous in character so that they might educate, organize, administer and defend the particular locality in their charge. The Hinh Plan was approved by the Franco-Vietnamese Military Committee at its meeting on February 24, 1953. The Committee also agreed to a greater participation on the part of Vietnam in the conduct of military operations and to transfer to it the control over all operations in Mytho, Vinh Long, Tra Vinh in South Vietnam; Phan Ri, Phan Thiet in Central Vietnam; and Hung Yen in North Vietnam. (128) . . . Once Ngo Dinh Diem took over the Government, he wanted to keep the army under his control as an instrument of establishing his authority. This started a struggle for power between the Prime Minister and the Chief of Staff of the National Army. It was reported that Diem had vetoed the plan suggested by Hinh by which the Army was to start a political campaign in conjunction with private politico-religious sects as a means of fighting communism. The Prime Minister opposed such a popular campaign by the army presumably to retain the political initiative with him. The conflict between the General and the Premier came to the surface in September 1954 when the Prime Minister tried to sack General Hinh overnight and failed. Diem publicly repudiated Hinh and asked him to proceed to France for a "prolonged stay." General Hinh defied the direct order by the Premier to quit his job on the plea that such orders could be given only by the Chief of State. He said that he refused to obey Diem because "he tried to expel me at a moment when my country was in danger."
More than once the American Embassy in Saigon intervened to prevent Diem from being physically ejected from leadership during his quarrel with General Hinh and the Army. At that time the idea seemed to have been that if only Hinh could be got out of the way, all would automatically be well. But General Hinh felt that his refusal to leave Saigon was not the thing which stood in the way of unity. He said that the "crisis arose because I was in favor of Union and Government has been against it." However, the pressure exerted by the United States through Paris broke the stalemate by inducing Bao Dai to dismiss General Hinh from his post. Bao Dai asked Hinh to visit him in Paris for consultations.
General Hinh left Saigon on November 19, 1954, more than two months after defying Diem's direct orders to do so. After reaching France he attacked the Premier several times accusing him of inefficiency and of refusing cooperation with the Army in formulating a strong social and economic program to fight communist infiltration. Bao Dai had called the General to France in the hope of persuading him to submit to the Government "to avoid the birth of factions or of clans harmful to gathering together of the nation's forces at a time when unity is more important than ever." As the General refused to submit to Bao Dai's point of view, he was removed from his post of Chief of Staff of the National Army on November 29, 1954.
Once General Hinh was removed from his way, Diem thought of reducing rather than increasing the moral and material power of the Army to end any threat to his own position from that side. Surprisingly enough, the majority of the Army was against the Premier and in favor of the dismissed Chief of Staff. Because of this reason, Diem opposed the idea of replacing Hinh with General Nguyen van Vy, a combat soldier who enjoyed even greater confidence of the army than Hinh. General Vy, who was next in command to Hinh, refused to take over Hinh's job when asked by Diem during the crisis and remained loyal to General Hinh. The Prime Minister favored Brigadier-General Le Van Ty, whom he promoted from Colonel to General as Chief of Staff. On December 13, 1954, by a Decree of the Chief of State, Brigadier-General Ty was named Chief of Staff in replacement of General Nguyen van Hinh. General Nguyen van Vy was appointed Inspector General of the National Army. After complicated negotiations between the two Generals, they agreed on a common attitude and General Ty accepted only on condition that General Vy should be accorded powers that would give him a considerable part in the direction of the Army. They demanded virtual autonomy for the Army as a semi-independent corps.
The Government and the Army agreed upon a general amnesty except for General Hinh. The Premier pardoned the officers who were compromised in the resistance against him and the Army pardoned the officers who revolted in the name of the Premier. The Army announced that it would no longer engage in politics but at the same time obtained the Premier's promise that he would no longer interfere in Army affairs. The compromise, though fragile and complicated, had nevertheless improved the situation to a great extent and facilitated the Prime Minister's task of dealing with the problem of integrating the private armies belonging to Cao Dai, Hoa Hao and Binh Xuyen Sects. (129-30) . . . Using the trump card of US support, Prime Minister Diem managed in September 1954 to persuade the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao sects to accept eight ministerships in his Government. According to some observers, this kind of support was far more a matter of finance than of politics. Diem used the American aid money to buy political support from the sects. This method of buying political support was tried in China with disastrous effects and Diem and his advisers realized that very soon. The American advisers of Diem felt that the sects did not constitute ideal allies in the struggle against communism. They were feudal, determined at any cost to hold to their privileged position, and hardly an influence toward an enlightened Government. (132) . . . . . . On May 1, 1955, Bao Dai sent a message to Diem to go to Cannes for "consultations of the most representative personalities of all parties and groups." He said that his intention was not hostile but wanted to intervene to avoid civil war or at least its development and to "find Governmental formula as representative as possible of all the tendencies of people. The first person that I intended to consult was precisely yourself." He stated that he was convinced that Diem's good faith and patriotism would prevail. The reaction of Diem was altogether different. On May 2, 1955, he and three South Vietnam Army Generals, Le van Ty, Tran van Don and Nguyen van Minh, served notice on Bao Dai that they had taken power to appoint Governments out of his hands. They warned him that if the Government was opposed, they would follow only a regime selected "by the will of the people."
It was clear that Diem was moving closer and closer to an ultimate break with the Chief of State. The position of Bao Dai became increasingly equivocal. his prolonged absence from his country during its most critical years, his increasing identification with the relics of French colonial rule and the disunion among his supporters in Vietnam--above all, lack of any resolute determination on his part to abandon a pleasant private life for the irksome cares of State--all these things combined to undermine his position even in a country where the imperial mystique was strong.
On May 4, 1955, the South Vietnam Government held a National Political Congress of Diem's supporters to consider the dismissal of Bao Dai as Chief of State. The Conference was called "States-General" after a body established at the outset of the French Revolution. Delegates came from all 39 provinces chosen by local Government bodies, political parties and military groups. This Congress of Vietnamese provincial and municipal councilors called by the Prime Minister, adopted a resolution on May 5, 1955, which asked Bao Dai to give up all his powers and transmit full civil and military authority to Diem. The resolution further called for the establishment of peace and order by the Prime Minister and the organization of elections for National Assembly within six months which would decide whether Vietnam should be a republic or a constitutional monarchy.
A bigger political conference took place on May 5, 1955, in Saigon which was sponsored by the People's National Revolutionary Committee. Four thousand representatives of 95 political parties and branch Revolutionary Committees from all over South Vietnam attended the Congress. After eight hours of speeches and debate against Bao Dai, colonialism and communism, the Revolutionary Congress adopted a set of principles and an action program which called for the elimination of Bao Dai. The principles called for unity among all the nationalist forces, refusal of all power to Bao Dai, strengthening of South Vietnam against communism, collaboration with anti-communist, anti-colonial and anti-feudal forces throughout Southeast Asia and the establishment of a nationalist, socialist, democratic regime for South Vietnam. The action program demanded dismissal of Bao Dai and expressed confidence in Diem
At this stage it is useful to note that the question of the Chief of State of South Vietnam had provided an embarrassing legal puzzle. Bao Dai was surrounded by an atmosphere of "legalism" as the State of Vietnam owed its existence in international law to the recognition accorded to its Chief of State, Bao Dai, by 43 nations. The continuity of the State rested on him and in his office. There had been no person or body legally authorized to succeed him. Diem himself held his appointment as Prime Minister from the Chief of State. As the institution of the Chief of State represented the continuity of constitutional authority, the foreign powers were reluctant to accept the abolition of the institution of the Chief of State. [The Revolutionary Committee had sent messages to the 43 Powers that recognized Bao Dai as Chief of State stating that Bao Dai had been deposed and South Vietnam a Republic. To this Britain and France replied that they were officially unaware of the existence of the Revolutionary Committee and they recognized no other than Bao Dai as Chief of State. The United States did not reply to this message.] So, Diem had to move with caution. However, on May 15, 1955, Diem abolished Bao Dai's imperial guard and gradually took away crown lands in Annam and Bao Dai's other prerogatives. On June 10, the Council of the Royal Nguyen Phuc family of Vietnam met in Hue and stripped Bao Dai of his functions as Chief of State and asked Diem to become the first provisional President of the Vietnam Republic. [A few days before, the Revolutionary Committee entered the Royal Palace in Hue, confiscated Bao Dai's seal and closed his office.]
With a view to eliminating all opposition to his authority, Diem finally decided to depose Bao Dai and install himself as Chief of State by means of a referendum. On October 8, 1955, Diem announced a plan for a referendum to be held on October 23 by which the Vietnamese people would choose between him and Bao Dai as Chief of State. Bao Dai strongly attacked the referendum announced by Diem in a statement issued on October 13 in Paris. The Governments of France, Britain, the United States, Soviet Russia and India, to whom the statement was handed over, were asked "neither to support nor encourage a Governmental activity which conforms neither to the profound sentiment of the Vietnamese people nor to the common cause of peace." Bao Dai took the line that Diem was trying to worsen relations with North Vietnam and that the unity of the country to be effected under the terms of the Geneva Agreement by the holding of general elections, was endangered by his policy and continuance in office. He declared that his goal as Chief of State had been to realize the unity and independence of Vietnam and to reestablish peace there.
On October 18 Bao Dai revoked the mission given to Diem and the "full powers given to the Roman Catholic Premier have been cancelled." Bao Dai, in an official declaration to his people, stated, "I could no longer lend my name and my law to someone who will hurl you into ruin, famine and war." He declared that he would bestow the legitimate power "of which I remain the only guardian" on the National Assembly established through free elections by the Vietnamese people. This was the last round in the long drawn out struggle between Bao Dai and Diem.
The dismissal of Diem by Bao Dai was regarded by Foreign Powers as a development "essentially internal in character, primarily the concern of the Vietnamese people." But the Vietnamese people were not even aware of the fact that Bao Dai had dismissed the Prime Minister. Local newspapers, subject to strict Government censorship, did not publish the report. However, the legal position remained obscure as Diem himself held his appointment as Prime Minister from the Chief of State and his position, since Bao Dai's final spectacular action depriving him of power, had no judicial foundation. Whatever the legal implications, the fact remained that Diem was in effective control of the Government and he had decided to replace Bao Dai with himself as the Chief of State.
The means Diem adopted to ascertain the popular opinion regarding the Chief of State were criticized as undemocratic, farcical and "a piece of political chicanery." No one, including Bao Dai, doubted the outcome of the referendum. The result of the referendum was a foregone conclusion and was bound to go in Diem's favor "owing to methods employed by his regime." Each voter was to receive a ballot paper in two parts--one with the picture of Diem in red, bearing the inscription "I depose Bao Dai and recognize Diem as Head of State charged with the commission of setting up a democratic regime," and the other with a picture of Bao Dai in green and the inscription "I do not depose Bao Dai and do not regard Diem as the Head of State charged with setting up a Democratic regime." The ballot paper was to be detached from the counter-foil to facilitate subsequent identification of the voter.
The manner in which the people of South Vietnam were compelled to choose between the two arbitrarily named leaders was considered farcical. If Bao Dai was discredited, this by no means amounted to a confirmation of Diem's leadership. The people were not given any other choice but to select one of them. Objection to the proposed referendum was raised by Dr. Nguyen Phan Long, a former Prime Minister of Vietnam and about 60 other prominent politicians on the ground that "the system of one-man rule which has lasted too long should be done away with as quickly as possible and replaced by a truly democratic regime."
The result of the referendum by which Diem became the Chief of State changed nothing in that Bao Dai had long ceased to exercise effective control over his Government in Vietnam but it provided a firmer international standing for Diem. Added to this, the very fact that several million people were induced to commit themselves in Diem's favor further discouraged his opponents in the South. While commenting on the referendum, the Economist of London wrote on October 2, 1955, that "with the scales so weighted, it was surely unnecessary to make the gravitational pull of Mr. Diem doubly certain by dubious means and it seems a pity that the number who voted in the Saigon-Cholon area is reported to have exceeded the total of names on the register by 150,000." In the opinion of the Economist the referendum of South Vietnam was clearly an instrument of power rather than an accurate reflection of the popular will. The referendum was considered by the Peking People's Daily as a means adopted by Diem in an attempt to legalize the division of Vietnam and "make it impossible to implement the Geneva Agreement." The newspaper said that the referendum was an utter violation of the Geneva Agreement. In certain quarters it was felt that Diem's accession to supreme power might mean that there would be no all-Vietnam general elections as foreseen by the Geneva Agreement and that the country was destined to remain divided into two for an unforeseeable period.
On October 24, 1955, the very next day of the referendum, even before the results of the referendum were formally notified, France and America accepted the fact of Diem's success and came out with their recognition of Diem as Head of State. The French Government withdrew its support from Bao Dai and the United States was gratified that "the referendum was conducted in such an orderly and efficient manner and that the people of Vietnam have made their choice unmistakably clear." As the popularly elected Head of State, Ngo Dinh Diem declared South Vietnam a Republic and himself the first President on October 26, 1955. [The proclamation of a Republic in South Vietnam brought no immediate change in the relations between that country and France. Having made no specific move to withdraw from the French Union, the Republic of Vietnam was considered part of the French Union.] (138-143) * * * X. American Support to Diem
General Lawton Collins arrived in Saigon on November 8, 1954, as Special Envoy of President Eisenhower with the rank of Ambassador, to coordinate American aid to Vietnam. At a Press Conference on November 17, 1954, General Collins proclaimed in no uncertain terms US support to Diem and asked united Vietnamese backing for the Government of Diem. He declared: "I have come to Vietnam to bring every possible aid to the Government of Diem and to his Government only. It is the legal Government in Vietnam and the aid which the United States will lend it would permit the Government to save the country" He announced that a US Military Mission was entrusted with instructing the Vietnamese Army. In effect, the United States gave to the Diem Government a "blank check" and since then Diem could find support in the American Embassy in Saigon and the State Department in Washington which he could not find among his own people. However, on the recommendation of General Collins the United States decided to continue and expand support for South Vietnam.
Mr. John Foster Dulles, the US Secretary of State, visited Saigon on February 28, 1955, after the Bangkok Conference of SEATO to assure Diem that no responsible Allied Government had doubts as to his ability to handle Vietnam's affairs. He admired the leadership which Diem was giving to those who were dedicated to the establishment of a free, independent and secure nation. There was no secret that the United States took over the political leadership in South Vietnam and was openly intervening, at almost every level, on behalf of Diem's regime. They had reached the point of no return with Diem. The American political forces were committed in South Vietnam and so much was staked with Diem, including the American reputation, that any change in their policy appeared impossible. (146) . . . The bitter fighting on the streets of Saigon-Cholon on April 28-29, 1955, between the Government troops and the Binh Xuyen forces brought conflict and confusion in Washington, Paris and London. The French Premier Edgar Faure stated that it had become apparent that Diem was no longer equal to the task of governing. Official sources in London let it be known that in the opinion of the British Government Diem would have to be replaced. Just a few days before this, General Paul Ely and General Collins felt that Diem should be replaced by another nationalist leader with a broader basis of Government. General Collins, who returned to Washington on April 24, 1955, for consultations, in his report to Senate and House Foreign Policy Committees about the political situation in Vietnam, stated that Diem faced grave and perhaps insurmountable difficulties to stay in power. He felt the situation was not "hopeless" but "stronger leadership" was needed to keep South Vietnam from chaos. [New York Herald Tribune, April 28, 1955. Soon after, General Collins was transferred from Vietnam and he left Saigon on May 15, 1955.] Nevertheless, Mr. Dulles sent a message to Diem assuring him that the State Department continued to support his Government. (148-9) . . . Although the State of Vietnam had been described as independent since 1949, South Vietnam's Government had achieved the real substance of independence only in 1954. In addition to the Treaties signed between the State of Vietnam and the French Republic, the declaration made by M. Mendes-France at the Geneva Conference to respect the independence and sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of the Indochinese States helped a great deal in perfecting their independence. Thus, the civil administration of the territory south of the 17th Parallel which was entrusted to the High Command of the French Union Forces had been completely taken over by the Government of the State of Vietnam. Even though the evolution of the State of Vietnam as a completely independent State had no direct relation with the implementation of the provisions of the Geneva Agreement as the Agreement was signed by France on behalf of the Franco-Vietnamese Command with the High Command of the People's Army of Vietnam, it had a great deal of indirect influence on the effective implementation of the Geneva Agreement. (155-6) . . . While enjoying all the advantages of the armistice agreement, including the guarantee of peace in the country, the South Vietnamese Government still refused to recognize the Geneva Accords and shoulder the responsibility thereunder. As the time approached for starting consultations between the competent authorities of the two zones from July 1955 to discuss the general elections scheduled to be held in July 1956 to unify the country as stipulated in the Geneva Agreement, Ngo Dinh Diem denounced the Geneva Agreement and refused to talk with the Viet Minh. He felt strong enough after his initial success against the sects and Bao Dai to denounce the Geneva Agreement and the International Commission. The South Vietnamese police arrested more than 100 men and women in Saigon for having demonstrated in favor of consultations between the South and North for elections to unite the country. In other parts of South Vietnam people were arrested and kept in prison for explaining the provisions of the Geneva Agreement to their friends which was considered as subversive activity. A number of anti-Geneva Agreement and anti-International Commission demonstrations took place in Saigon and other parts of South Vietnam between July 7 and 20, 1955. The demonstrations were a part of the campaign to denounce the "communist misdeeds" observed by various political groups and students in South Vietnam with the approval of the authorities. (157) * * * XI. Sovereign States of Vietnam
For a thousand years from 600 A.D. Vietnam was a province of China. Between 1600 and 1880 various independent Vietnamese dynasties ruled over the country after overthrowing the Chinese domination. Under the Nguyen dynasty Vietnam was unified. During the period of French colonial occupation between 1880 and 1940, the idea of Vietnam as a unified territory was abandoned and it was divided into Tonkin, Annam and Cochin-China. From 1940 to 1945 during World War II, the French ruled over Vietnam under Japanese control and from March to August 1945 the Japanese took over direct control and installed Bao Dai as the ruler of Vietnam. The August Revolution in 1945 organized by the Vietnamese League and the surrender of the Japanese coincided and the revolutionaries won independence and established the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.
On September 2, 1945, Ho Chi Minh declared that "from now on we break all relations of a colonial character with France; we repeal all the international obligations that France had so far subscribed to on behalf of Vietnam and we abolish all the special rights the French have unlawfully acquired in our Father-land." He also expressed the conviction that the Allied nations which have acknowledged the principle of self-determination and equality of nations would not refuse to acknowledge the independence of Vietnam. The position of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam was strengthened by the abdication of Bao Dai in favor of the Republican regime and becoming the supreme adviser to the Ho Chi Minh Government. At that moment, the political situation was very clear: the French had fled; the Japanese surrendered; Bao Dai abdicated and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam established its supreme authority all over Vietnam.
Thanks to the British Government, the French were brought back to Vietnam and were made responsible for civil administration in the territory south of the 16th Parallel. For reasons of political expediency the French in their agreement with Ho Chi Minh in March 1946 had recognized the Democratic Republic of Vietnam as a free state with a Government, parliament, Army and finances as a part of the Indochinese Federation and the French Union and in exchange secured the right to send their troops into North Vietnam for a period of five years. The very fact that the French troops could enter the Democratic Republic of Vietnam territory only with the express permission and agreement with that Government was very significant in determining the complete control of the area by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. As has already been observed, open hostilities broke out between the French and the Democratic republic of Vietnam on December 19, 1946, and thus confused the legal situation.
The situation was further complicated by the creation of a parallel Government by the French during the hostilities under Bao Dai. In March 1949 an Agreement was signed between Bao Dai and the French by which Vietnam was promised independence within the French Union, and Bao Dai committed Vietnam as an Associated State agreeing to send representatives to the High Council and the Assembly of the French Union. Bao Dai recognized the right of the French to control Vietnam's foreign policy and its military forces. Although the Agreement stated that the Government of Vietnam shall exercise fully all of the attributes and prerogatives implied by internal sovereignty, the French economic regime of the country, when Indochina was part-colonial, part-protectorate, was carefully preserved. Vietnam required the permission of the French Government before it changed the status of any French property and enterprise in its territory, and when the Vietnamese Government employed foreign advisers and technicians they were to be from France whenever possible and had to be approved by the French Government.
The French kept a special legal status for their own nationals and whenever Frenchmen or foreigners, protected by special treaty with France, were involved in legal cases, they were not to be tried under Vietnamese law but under French law and before mixed courts in which Frenchmen as well as Vietnamese would sit. Even though the Agreement permitted Vietnam its own army responsible for the maintenance of order and internal security, it required the Vietnamese army to come to the defense of the empire and to have French military advisers and French equipment. According to Article 62 of the French Union Constitution, "members of the French Union shall put together the totality of their means to guarantee the defense of the whole of the Union. The Government of the Republic shall assume the coordination of the means and the direction of the policy aiming at preparing and assuring this defense."
Under the French Constitution, Associated Statehood was far removed from independence. The State of Vietnam as created by the French was not a State in a real sense as it did not possess a sovereign Government. Until June 1954 this semi-independent status of the Bao Dai Government continued. For the first time in the Franco-Vietnamese relationship, France agreed to sign a Treaty in July 1954 recognizing complete independence and full and entire sovereignty of Vietnam and signed a separate Treaty establishing a Franco-Vietnamese Association within the French Union based on equality. Even then the Prime Minister of South Vietnam, Ngo Dinh Diem, was not very happy with the position of South Vietnam in the French Union and in March 1955 the Premier of South Vietnam asked France that Vietnam be granted a status in the French Union similar to that of India in the Commonwealth. He asked: "Is it impossible for Vietnam to play as important a role towards France as that of India towards England in this rank which is unavoidably our rank and the rank of liberty to maintain our dearest ideal of peace?" However, with the declaration of the Republic of Vietnam by Ngo Dinh Diem in October 1955 for the first time South Vietnam became a sovereign State.
This broad retrospect of the history of Vietnam is vital to appreciate the question of legal authority in Vietnam. It is clear that Vietnam as a State existed only for a brief period under the Vietnamese kings prior to French rule and under French colonial rule Vietnam as a State disappeared. However, Vietnam as a State reappeared with the establishment of the Democratic Republic as it possessed all the ingredients of statehood. There is a section of opinion according to which the Declaration of Independence of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam was an extralegal act which had to be supported by fact and recognized by the international community before it could create any legal consequences. According to this view, as the democratic Republic of Vietnam was set up through revolution it could not claim any de jure sovereignty which could only be passed on by the existing legitimate authority to another. As a consequence, the protagonists of this view conclude that the sole de jure sovereign authority in Vietnam was the State of Vietnam created by the French with its headquarters in Saigon. (164-7) . . . It would indeed be strange if France, whose present constitution is based on the French Revolution of 1789, was to deny the legitimacy of origin of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam on the ground that its origin was revolutionary and unconstitutional. If we glance through the history of Vietnam, it would be seen that the French themselves came to Vietnam not through legitimate constitutional means but through colonial invasion. Even the present Government of South Vietnam came into existence by extralegal means. Diem's declaration of a Republic in South Vietnam had no legal basis, except the recognition accorded to it by the Western powers as a de facto Government, as he himself held his appointment from the Chief of State, Bao Dai, who had deprived him of all authority previous to the referendum. If the doctrine of legitimacy is applied to Vietnam, the legitimate Government would have to be sought for in the misty depths of history as even the Vietnamese Emperors of Hue obtained their independence from Chinese rulers by force.
The Declaratory or de facto doctrine is now recognized by most authorities in constitutional and international law, according to which the existence of a Government within a State is a question of fact. The fact that a person or a group governed effectively is the decisive test of the existence of the Government and its right to rule. A foreign State through recognition acknowledges this fact and treats the Government in that capacity. It does not pass judgment upon the form or origin of that Government. Professor Lauterpacht, an eminent authority on international law, as gone so far as to maintain that there is a duty to recognize the Government "provided that the conditions presented by international law are fulfilled." These conditions are, according to him, permanency and effectiveness.
British foreign policy had constantly been guided by the de facto doctrine as th primary means of finding out authority in a State. The principle they followed in recognizing foreign revolutionary Governments was stated in the House of Lords by Lord Malmesbury as "to acknowledge the constitutional doctrine that the people of every country have the right to choose their own sovereign without any foreign interference and that a sovereign having been freely chosen by them, that sovereign, or ruler or whatever he may be called being de facto the ruler of that country, should be recognized by the sovereign of this." During the Spanish Revolutions, British recognition was extended to the successive revolutionary Governments and the most recent example is the recognition of the People's Republic of China which came into being through a process of civil war.
In the past the United States also followed this practice. The rule was laid down in the memorable words of Secretary of State Jefferson: "It accords with our principle to acknowledge any Government to be rightful which is formed by the will of the people substantially declared." The right to choose their own Government, he urged, was a right whereon the United States was founded and must not be denied to other people. In 1900 the US Acting Secretary of State Hill wrote that the "policy of the United States announced and practiced upon occasions for more than a century has been and is to refrain from acting upon conflicting claims to the de jure control of the executive power of a foreign State but not to base the recognition of a foreign Government solely on its de facto ability to hold the reins of administrative power." [Quoted in T.C. Chan's The International Law of Recognition, p. 121.] (169-70) . . . Thus, it is obvious that the doctrine of legitimacy as applied in Vietnam is outmoded and definitely not in consonance with the trend of world opinion. The Democratic Republic of Vietnam was ruling in the area North of the 16th Parallel as a sovereign State between August 1945 and December 1946. It was in effective control of this area and there was no French interference during this period. General elections were held, a National Assembly was elected and a constitution was drawn up for the country by the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. The French Government did not at that stage question the existence of the new Republic and, in fact, by implication recognized its existence and its effectiveness by opening negotiations with official representatives of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam on several occasions.
During this period, in the area South of the 16th Parallel, the French were brought back for civil administration and the revolutionary Government set up was dispersed within a few weeks and during the period from August 1945 to December 1946 the French were in effective control of that area. According to de facto doctrine, therefore, before the civil war there were in fact two sovereign authorities--the Democratic Republic of Vietnam as a sovereign State in the North and French colonial rule in the South. During the period of civil war, which lasted from December 1946 to July 1954, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam was in effective control of about sixty percent of the territory. Both these Governments claimed to be the sovereign authorities over the entire country. The claim of these two Governments were often "not plain matters of fact but the subject of conflicting opinions."
During the civil war, the Democratic Republic was recognized by the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union and a number of other East European countries. On January 30, 1950, the Soviet Union recognized the Ho Chi Minh Government on the ground that it represented the overwhelming majority of the population of the country. The State of Vietnam created by the French was recognized by the United States of America, Great Britain and a number of other West European countries. France itself did not recognize the State of Vietnam as a sovereign State during the civil war. however, Oppenheim, the most eminent authority on international law, after lengthy chapters on the meaning of sovereignty and the meaning of State, included both Viet Minh and Vietnam as States which were international persons. [Oppenheim's International Law, 8th edition 1955, Volume I, p. 258. The list of States was prepared by Professor Lauterpacht who is one of the most eminent authorities in international law and Judge of the International Court of Justice at The Hague. According to him during the civil war Viet Minh was a sovereign State and Vietnam's sovereignty was limited by its membership in the French Union, as an Associated State.]
The complicated question of doctrines apart, it is interesting to study the effect of the Geneva Agreement on the constitutional and legal aspects of the question of sovereignty and the State of Vietnam. During the Geneva Conference, the Delegation of the State of Vietnam proposed that there must be no partition of the national territory of Vietnam either de facto or de jure and in view of the territorial and political unity of Vietnam, there must be "recognition of the principle that the only State qualified to represent Vietnam is the State incarnated by His Majesty Bao Dai, Chief of the State." In spite of this demand and the French insistence on the non-recognition of the Viet Minh, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam participated in the Conference as an independent Government and its Vice-Minister of National Defense signed the Agreements on behalf of the Commander-in-Chief of the People's Army of Vietnam. The documents signed at Geneva did not make any mention of who was the legitimate and de jure sovereign of the territory of Vietnam. The Conference scrupulously avoided the problem of determining the legal sovereign State in Vietnam.
The entire negotiations at Geneva were based on the assumption of one Vietnam and the ceasfire line was purely a military arrangement in order to bring about cessation of hostilities and to provide for the actual unification which was to be accomplished through the medium of general elections. The partition of the country was intended as a temporary phase for the purpose of regroupment of the two fighting armies. No political settlement was reached at Geneva but a political settlement was visualized in the Final Declaration of the Geneva Agreement. It was expected that consultations would take place between the competent representatives of the two zones in July 1955 for the purpose of organizing general elections in July 1956 which would unify the country. It is significant to note the words "competent representatives of the two zones" used in paragraph 7 of the Final Declaration. The words "representatives of the Governments" were not used nor have the words "representatives of the two High Commands" been used. Thus, the Geneva Conference cleverly left out any mention of legal authority or recognition of any Government. (170-3) . . . The political settlement as visualized by the Geneva Agreement did not come off and the hopes of creating a united, independent, sovereign State of Vietnam by means of general elections receded to the background. Added to this, a vital change which was not visualized by the Geneva Agreement took place in the political situation of Vietnam with the overthrowing of Bao Dai and the proclamation of a Republic of Vietnam in the territory south of the 17th Parallel by Ngo Dinh Diem. This proclamation which was based on a referendum organized by the Ngo Dinh Diem administration was confined to the territory south of the 17th Parallel and could claim sovereign authority only in that territory. This additional factor of the creation of a sovereign Republic in the South and the failure to achieve unity of Vietnam under a single Government left the legal position undetermined. (175) . . . Irrespective of interpretations, with the simple application of the de facto doctrine, one can say that there are two sovereign States at present in Vietnam. Both the States are completely independent with full fledged Governments of their own owing no allegiance to the other. this view had been strengthened by the Co-Chairmen's message to the Government of the Republic of Vietnam on May 8, 1956. It is most significant that the Co-Chairmen did not address their message to the signatory parties of the Geneva Agreement who were the French Union High Command and the High Command of the people's Army of Vietnam but to the two Governments. Two important factors emerge out of this departure from usual practice. Firstly, the Co-Chairmen have appealed for the first time since the Geneva Agreement came into operation to the civil authorities of both sides and not to the military authorities. Secondly, they recognized the existence of two sovereign Governments in Vietnam and also recognized that the French have no longer any authority in Vietnam. [Acting with the authority of the Governments of the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs for Great Britain, Lord Reading, and the First Deputy Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, Mr. A. Gromyko, have met in London as representatives of the two Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference on Indochina to examine the problems relating to the fulfillment of the Geneva Agreements in Vietnam and have sent a message dated May 8, 1956, to the Governments of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the Republic of Vietnam.] (176-7) * * * XII. Deadlock in Vietnam
The very fact that the Western powers wanted no political settlement and suggested a ten-year time-limit after the ceasefire for general elections, then came down to five years, and finally were forced to agree to two years because of the military situation at that time, makes one wonder whether they were ever serious about a political settlement in Vietnam. This doubt was substantiated by subsequent events and attitudes taken by them. (179) . . . Legalities apart, the French washed their hands of the Geneva Agreement just a few months before the time-limit prescribed for general elections. This contingency was visualized at the Geneva Conference and a provision was incorporated in the ceasefire agreement according to which "the signatories of the present agreement and their successors in their functions shall be responsible for ensuring the observance and enforcement of the terms and provisions thereof." Nevertheless, the French never talked about their successors and completely ignored their obligations about their commitments under the Geneva Agreement.
As early as January 1955 the Economist in an editorial stated that the American policy since Geneva had clearly been directed towards strengthening the Saigon regime and the aid given was obviously no meant to provide a free gift for the Viet Minh at the expense of the American taxpayer. It presumed that the only intelligible aim of the American policy was to give the Southern Government the best possible chance of survival on as permanent a basis as that of South Korea. According to Mr. C.L. Sulzberger, the New York Times columnist, all-Vietnam elections "really will never be held. . . . The noncommunist South cannot afford the slightest risk of defeat. Nobody likes to talk about this but when the time to admit it arrives, a grave crisis must inevitably develop." (179-80) . . . As was well-known, the United States never made any secret of its opposition to a political settlement on the lines visualized by the Geneva Agreement. Its argument that the general elections, if at all held, should be conducted under UN supervision, was a complete negation of the Agreements arrived at Geneva. At the same time, it maintained that South Vietnam was not a signatory of the said agreements and was by no means bound by its clauses. For the United States the imperatives in the situation were obvious: "South Vietnam must be strengthened; and we must not be trapped into a fictitious legalism that could condemn ten million potentially free persons into slavery." [New York Times, July 21, 1955.] Secretary of State Dulles told a news conference in Washington on August 13, 1955, that free elections to unite North and South Vietnam were not possible at that time. (181) . . . The immediate reaction of the Government of the Democratic Republic to Diem's negative attitude on general elections and outright rejection of the Geneva Agreement was of unusual restraint. Pham van Dong took a bold step in writing directly to the Prime Minister of the South Vietnam Government for the first time asking for direct consultations between the two parties. In a note addressed to the Chief of State and Prime Minister of the State of Vietnam on July 19, 1955, Mr. Pham van Dong on behalf of the President of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam proposed to Diem that "you appoint your representatives and that they and ours hold the consultative conference from July 20, 1955, onwards as provided for by the Geneva Agreement at a place agreeable to both sides on the Vietnamese territory in order to discuss the problems of unification of our country by means of free general elections all over Vietnam." This note was most significant as it was for the first time in their relations the North recognized the independent existence of the Republic of Vietnam. It was evident that the Democratic Republic had recognized the French failure to implement the Geneva Agreement without the cooperation of the authorities in the South. (184) . . . . . .[T]alk about genuinely free elections in Vietnam brought forth two interesting statements in the shape of letters to the editor of Nhan Dan [Nov. 17, 1955, and Feb. 25, 1956], official organ of the ruling Lao Dong party in the North from no less a person than Ho Chi Minh himself. While answering Western concern about free elections, the letter gave details of what the people and Government of the Democratic Republic consider as free general elections:
Free Elections: All the Vietnamese citizens, male and female above 18 years old, regardless of class, nationality, religion, political affiliation, have the right to participate in the elections, to vote freely for the persons in whom they have confidence.
Free Candidature: All Vietnamese citizens, male and female above 21 years old, also with the above-mentioned non-restriction clauses, have the right to stand for elections.
Free Canvass: All Vietnamese citizens, whether from the North or the South, have the right to canvass freely throughout the country through conference, leaflets, press, etc. The Government of the North and the authorities of the South should ensure the liberty and the security for all citizens during their activities for elections.
Method of Voting: Totally equal, secret and direct. In short, the Vietnamese people and the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam shall ensure complete freedom and democracy to the nationwide elections (as provided in the Geneva Agreement).
The second letter proposed a method by which the Western countries could determine which part of Vietnam had democratic freedoms. According to this, the Democratic Republic Government offered to allow any number of representatives of the South to campaign in the North and the Democratic Republic would guarantee their complete security and the right to campaign freely their electoral propaganda provided their own representatives were allowed to do the same in the South. (187-8) . . . While this debate was going on among the Western powers about the political settlement in Vietnam, Mr. Pham van Dong, Foreign Minister of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, addressed a letter on August 17, 1955, to the Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference in which he made known the position of his Government with regard to "the grave situation menacing the political settlement in Vietnam." The Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam felt that the implementation of the Geneva Agreement and the political settlement in Vietnam were seriously menaced owing to the attitude of the authorities in South Vietnam. They demanded that the French Government and the Government of South Vietnam should assume their obligation for the execution of the Geneva Agreement for the cessation of hostilities as well as for the political settlement. They further requested the Co-Chairmen to take all necessary measures to ensure respect for the Geneva Agreement, settlement of the political problem in Vietnam, the immediate convening of the consultative conference between the competent representative authorities of the North and the Southern zones to discuss the unification of Vietnam through general elections. (190-1) . . . On January 24, 1955, the South Vietnam Government published two ordinances elaborating electoral rules for elections for its first National Assembly to be held on March 4, 1956. Voting for these elections would be direct and by universal suffrage but the Government clearly reserved the right to veto candidates not to its liking. Once elected the Deputies would be immune from arrest only if they did not support the policies or activities of communists or rebels--a provision which appeared to guarantee the Government's immunity from criticism. The Assembly's life was limited to 45 days. Within that time it would be required to vote on a draft constitution presented by the President. If the Assembly could not complete its work within 45 days it was to be dissolved and fresh elections held. If it completed its work within the time-limit prescribed, the Assembly might transform itself into the National Parliament. All candidates contesting the elections had to depend exclusively on the administration for their campaigning, finances, transport and propaganda.
All the opposition parties decided to boycott the elections and several Independents had candidature suppressed and in case of suspected electoral opponents, arrests had occurred. By a Presidential decree concentration camps were set up in South Vietnam and all the families of former Viet Minh supporters and opponents of the Government had been detained in those camps. Thus the stage was set for elections in South Vietnam alone which the Geneva Agreement of 1954 did not foresee. The only reason for this haste could be Diem's wish to have his constitution working by July 1956 when countrywide elections were supposed to be held under the Geneva Agreement. He was anxious to prove to his Western friends that he could make communism impossible in South Vietnam and thereby vindicate his course of action. (192-3) . . . The North with its numerical superiority of at least two million more people than the South was assured of winning over the Southerners. To complicate the issue further there remained considerable support for the Viet Minh in the South after the ceasefire. There was strong domestic political pressure on Diem to eliminate the possibility of elections in order to show to the people of the South that Viet Minh rule was not just round the corner and thereby persuade great many Southerners to rally finally and definitely to Diem's Government.
Above all these considerations the deadlock in Vietnam was created and maintained as part of "cold war strategy" between the American and the Soviet blocs. The present world situation is in twilight between peace and war, popularly known as "cold war" in which psychological warfare is the main strategy and ideology the best ammunition. Even though it was a conflict between two groups of forces, the cold war really concerned the political control of those regions which the uneven development of the world economy had placed in a position of inferiority towards the great metropolitan centers. The technique of altering the balance of power without recourse to military means was the outcome of a fundamental stalemate which had not been broken by the Korean conflict and which had entered Indochina since then.
It suited the Soviet strategy to fit in the Viet Minh nationalist struggle against the French in their anti-imperialist strategy which the Soviet Government had gradually elaborated. Soon after the ceasefire, the Americans took over the leadership in the South to build up an anti-communist State. Under these circumstances, local feelings, aspirations and considerations had to play a secondary role to that of cold war considerations. The situation in Vietnam was ripe to be included in the cold war strategy of the big powers and the two Governments in the two zones in Vietnam willingly accepted positions in the struggle.
However, the deadlock in Vietnam became complete with the establishment of a National Assembly in South Vietnam and the final withdrawal of the French High Command from Vietnam in April 1956. This deadlock could not be solved unless there was a corresponding alteration in the basic relations between Anglo-American and Sino-Soviet blocs. (194-5) * * *
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Last changed: October 28, 2001